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Introduction
Sisay Asefa
Western Michigan University

The Department of Economics of Western Michigan University was
fortunate to attract six eminent agricultural economists to its 1986-87
lecture-seminar series to address various dimensions of the problem of
world food and agriculture. This book contains six essays based on the
public lectures delivered by the guest scholars during the 1986-87
academic year.
This introductory chapter will address and synthesize some of the
main issues and problems of world food and agriculture and leave the
reader to pursue the detailed discussion and analysis of the issues by
the individual authors. The essays are presented in the order of the
scholar's appearance in the lecture-seminar series.
Some of the main issues and problems addressed in the essays are:
(1) the role of technical change in agricultural development; (2) the value
of learning from historical and comparative experience in tackling rural
and agricultural development problems; (3) the role of foreign assistance
in agricultural and rural development; and (4) the current problem of
hunger in Africa.

The Role of Technical Change in Agricultural Development
The issue of technical change in agricultural development is most ex
tensively explored in Vernon Ruttan's essay. In his model of "induced
technical change," Ruttan stresses the idea that technical change is in
digenous, that is, made possible by farmers' responses to differences
in availability and relative prices of resources.
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He argues that differences in the economic environment and resource
endowment are critical in influencing the direction of technical change.
He supports his argument by presenting empirical evidence based on
historical data on the experience of Japan and the United States in
agricultural development. He points out that Japan adopted a biological
and chemical agricultural technology that is land-substituting and laboraugmenting primarily as a response to the relative scarcity of arable
land it faced during its historic agricultural development. On the other
hand, the United States adopted a mechanical agricultural technology
that is labor-substituting and land-using because it had relatively abun
dant arable land and scarce labour during its historic period of agricultural
development. Ruttan shows, using comparative data of the two coun
tries, that the difference in long-term trends in relative factor prices
"induced" the different paths of technological change adopted by each
country.
Bruce Johnston extends the issue of technical change beyond the critical
role of relative factor prices and resource endowments by pointing out
that the promotion of technical change in agriculture is not automatic
and self-generating. He argues that the promotion of technical change
requires active participation by both private and public institutions. The
private aspect of technical change is determined by what he calls "farmlevel factors" that require investments in land improvement, equipment,
fertilizer, improved crop and livestock varieties, working capital, and
skills of farmers. Individual farmers are in the best position to under
take the decision about the proper acquisition and utilization of these
factors, while government can play a supportive role. On the other hand,
inappropriate government policies, such as unfavourable price policy
to farmers, can impede the development of these farm-level factors.
Successful adoption of farm-level technologies also requires what
Johnston calls "socially determined facts" such as agricultural research,
an extension system, and infrastructure, as well as appropriate
macroeconomic policy environment. The latter factors, which are com
plementary to the farm-level factors, are beyond the control of individual
farmers. They can best be provided by government.
The resource endowment situation of most developing countries is
characterized by abundant rural labor that calls for effective utilization
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in the agricultural sector which in turn requires the adoption of labourintensive chemical and biological technology as the most appropriate
form of technical change. Chemical and biological technology that is
yield-increasing is characterized by complementarity between inputs such
as fertilizer and water. This implies that in a tropical and semi-arid en
vironment, successful adoption of such technology requires adequate
water availability that can only be provided by irrigation in the absence
of reliable rainfall and the presence of recurrent drought.
Moreover, environmentally-specific chemical and biological
technologies are not on the shelf for some tropical regions of the world
such as Sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore important to take up the
challenge as stated by Ruttan: "Over the next few decades to develop
agricultural research capacity in each agro-climate region of the world
in order to take advantage of development in biological/chemical
technology."
The critical obstacle to generation and adoption of agricultural
technology in the future may not be the lack of scientific and technical
change, but may arise from domestic economic policy and political bar
riers to technical progress in the agriculture of many developing
countries.

The Value of Learning from Historical and Comparative Experience
in Tackling Rural and Agricultural Development Problems
Lessons from historical experience of other countries are quite valuable
in tackling problems of rural and agricultural development, provided
they are correctly understood and applied. The significance of past ex
perience in understanding the poverty problem in general is stated by
T.W. Schultz in his inaugural lecture for winning the Nobel prize in
development economics as follows: "Understanding the experience of
poor people over the ages can contribute much to understanding the
problems and possibilities of low-income countries today. That kind
of understanding is far more important than the most detailed and ex
act knowledge about the surface of the earth, or of ecology, or of tomor
row's technology." 1
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The historical experience of Japan and the United States in choosing
the technological path appropriate to their relative resource endowment
has already been pointed out. Further, as argued in Johnston's essay,
the Japanese experience is perhaps the most relevant for today's develop
ing countries, since it involved increasing small farm productivity by
adopting labor-intensive biological/chemical technology in the form of
fertilizer and improved crop varieties as well as the concurrent develop
ment of agriculture and industry which allowed positive interaction be
tween the two sectors and gradual absorption of labour by industry and
other sectors of the economy. If agricultural productivity had not risen
to provide adequate food supplies, the terms of trade would have turn
ed against the industrial sector retarding the growth of the Japanese
economy. However, this was prevented by Japan's successful adop
tion of biological and chemical technology which increased food pro
duction as well as provided necessary employment during the historic
transformation of the economy.
Comparative lesssons from a more recent experience of other develop
ing countries, such as India and China, also have some useful implica
tions for regions of the currently deficient agriculture and food pro
duction, such as Sub-Saharan Africa. The Indian case is presented by
Uma Lele who reminds us that, after the earlier policies that under
valued agriculture and contributed to the food crisis of the 1960s, India
later carried out an economic reform which included the development
of a strong agricultural research system and an effective fertilizer
distribution network, raised farm commodity prices, and provided in
centives to farmers to use fertilizer and new crop varieties. Lele points
out further tht the food situation of India before and during the reform
20 years ago was similar to the current food and agricultural situation
in Ethiopia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
While the institutional context is different, China's simultaneous em
phasis on rural and agricultural development and rural industrializa
tion featured by small labor-intensive rural industries also provides a
valuable lesson. Furthermore, China's experience with the organiza
tion of agriculture demonstrates a valuable lesson about the limitation
of collectivized agriculture as a viable economic unit of agricultural
development. After a long experience with collective farming, China
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found that even small collective farms posed serious incentive and
managerial problems and introduced, since 1981, reforms that have
essentially returned Chinese agriculture to a system of individual
household fanning units.
Valuable lessons from comparative experience can be drawn not on
ly from similarities but from dissimilarities, as stated by Lele. She points
out that, while Africa and India are of about the same geographical size,
Africa is much more diverse, constituting some 50 different nations,
about one thousand ethnic groups, and several thousand languages. In
dia, on the other hand, is one country with less diversity than Africa.
More significantly, Lele states that India's food production problem
was simplified by the fact that it was primarily a problem of increasing
the production of wheat and rice, for which technology was being
developed by the international research centres in cooperation with In
dian agricultural scientists. The current food production problem in
Africa, on the other hand, is more complex than the Indian case, since
it means the development and adoption of technologies for a more com
plex and diverse food grain system, such as sorghum, millet, maize,
cassava, root crops, for most of which environmentally-specific and
locally tested technologies have not been developed.

The Role of Foreign Assistance
in Agricultural and Rural Development
Foreign assistance can play an important role in agricultural and rural
development provided that it is properly focused and utilized in
alleviating rural poverty. Considerable experience with foreign assistance
has been gained over the past few decades to help distinguish between
which types of assistance have been successful and unsuccessful. Foreign
assistance has the greatest potential to succeed when it is focused on
agricultural and rural development. As John Mellor notes, this is because
of the employment- and income-generating implication of agriculture
that make increased food production and increased employment "two
sides of the same coin." Increased food production can initiate multi-
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pie forces of growth, employment and income generation in the whole
economy of a typical developing country characterized by the majority
of its population still on the rural sector, as implied in Mellor's essay.
Peter Timmer and John Mellor are in general agreement on the no
tion that improving agricultural and food production in developing coun
tries has a positive sum outcome of reducing poverty in the Third World
and increasing U.S. farm exports. Timmer's analysis, which emphasizes
a macroeconomic framework, is, however, cautiously optimistic about
the implication of increased food production in the Third World for
U.S. agricultural exports. He shows, through a complex web of general
equilibrium relationships, the structural adjustment to global competitive
pressures required by U.S. agriculture in the future.
Another feature of successful foreign assistance is that it is long term
and sustained, as noted by Eicher and Lele. Currently, there are good
reasons to be concerned with the state of foreign assistance in Africa,
which appears to be short term, unstable, and uncoordinated. Numerous
donors guided with diverse objectives and criteria are engaged in the
"business of foreign assistance" in Africa. The value of some of this
assistance in reducing poverty and hunger is quite questionable. Eicher
raises a challenging question to donors when he asks: "Why did the
U.S. government take the long view in India in the 1960s when it helped
develop 23 new state agricultural universities and funded their develop
ment for 15 years? Why is the United States taking the short-run view
in Africa in the 1980s?"
As a form of development assistance, food aid, which is currently
popular, is quite inadequate. It can only be justified as a tool of famine
relief, as stated by Johnston. Food assistance can even be harmful
because it may divert the attention of governments from the critical prob
lem of long-run agricultural development and poverty alleviation
required for ending hunger. Moreover, it cannot be sustained in the
long run and has the potential of being used as a political tool by donors
and recipients.
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The Current Problem of Hunger in Africa

The contemporary problem of hunger in Africa is most directly ad
dressed in Carl Richer's essay, where he outlines six challenges that
must be faced by scientists, policy makers and politicians in order to
end hunger in Africa. I find three of these challenges especially crucial.
One challenge posed by Richer to African politicians and governments
is to look back and learn from their own experience of recent history
and correct the mistaken economic policies that undervalued agriculture
and food production, and to face up to the fundamental fact that
agricultural development is an evolutionary and complex process that
does not lend itself to rhetoric, ideology, or crash food production cam
paigns. Current and future generations of African policy makers must
learn from the painful experience of some African nations that wasted
a generation on revolutionary rhetoric and ideological entanglement in
global power politics, and on hasty, ill-planned rural and agricultural
experimentation that has contributed to increasing mass poverty and
hunger.
Another challenge is the need to make a critical investment in human
capital development and carry out necessary educational reforms away
from the colonial elitist model that sets wrong curriculum priorities and
undermines technical and agricultural education. For instance, the
University of Botswana, 22 years after independence, does not have
a faculty of engineering or technology, and its faculty of agriculture
is just being launched during the current academic year.
The final challenge posed by Eicher is the need for policy makers,
both donors and recipients, to focus in what he calls ' 'the prime movers''
of agricultural development, such as new technology generation and
adoption, human capital and managerial skill development, biological
and physical capital development, institutional development and im
plementation, as well as development of an economic policy environ
ment favorable to agriculture and food production. It is important, as
pointed out by Eicher, for donors and African governments to make
long-term and sustained investments simultaneously on all of these
"prime movers" due to their complementary and lengthy gestation
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period. Emphasis on one factor, such as the one currently prescribed
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for mak
ing domestic price policy reform in exchange for additional loans and
grants can be ineffective. In other words, policy initiatives such as
domestic currency devaluation, abolishing price controls, eliminating
government grain boards and fertilizer subsidies, when carried out is
isolation without any clear guidelines and assistance to manage the
political and economic consequences, will be unlikely to succeed, as
Richer's essay implies.
In sum, African governments and policymakers must take the primary
responsibility and effort in restructuring their domestic policy environ
ment. Donors can assist in complementing this effort by making a
necessary long term and sustained investment in agricultural and rural
development.

NOTE
1. See the Nobel Lecture by T. W. Schultz ' 'The Economics of Being Poor,'' Journal of Political
Economy, 1980, 88, 4, p. 641.

Technical Change
and
Agricultural Development
Vernon W. Ruttan
University of Minnesota

We are, in the closing years of the twentieth century, completing one
of the most remarkable transitions in the history of agriculture. Prior
to this century, almost all increase in food production was obtained by
bringing new land into production. There were only a few exceptions
to this generalization in limited areas of East Asia, in the Middle East,
and in Western Europe. By the end of this century, almost all of the
increase in world food production must come from higher yields from
increased output per hectare. In most of the world, the transition from
a resource-based to a science-based system of agriculture is occurring
within a single century. In a few countries this transition began in the
nineteenth century. In most of the presently developed countries it did
not begin until the first half of this century. Most of the countries of
the developing world have been caught up in the transition only since
mid-century.

Models of Technical Change in Agriculture
The traditional literature on agricultural development can be classified
under five general headings. These are (1) the resource exploitation,
(2) the conservation, (3) the location, (4) the diffusion, and (5) the highpayoff input models.
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The Resource Exploitation Model
Throughout most of history, expansion of the area cultivated or grazed
has represented the dominant source of increase in agricultural produc
tion. The most dramatic example in western history was the opening
up of the new continents North and South America and Australia to
European settlement during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With
the advent of cheap transport during the latter half of the nineteenth
century, the countries of the new continents became increasingly im
portant sources of food and agricultural raw materials for the
metropolitan countries of Western Europe.
Similar processes had occurred earlier, though at a less dramatic pace,
in the peasant and village economies of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The
agrarian colonization of the Indus and Ganges river valleys occurred
in the third millennium B.C. The first millennium A.D. saw the
agricultural colonization of Europe north of the Alps, the Chinese set
tlement of the lands south of the Yangtze, and the Bantu occupation
of Africa south of the tropical forest belts. Intensification of land use
in existing villages was followed by pioneer settlement, the establish
ment of new villages, and the opening up of forest or jungle land to
cultivation. In Western Europe there was a series of successive changes
from neolithic forest fallow to systems of shifting cultivation of bush
and grassland followed first by short fallow systems, and later by an
nual cropping.
Where soil conditions were favorable, as in the great river basins and
plains, the new villages gradually intensified their system of cultiva
tion. Where soil resources were poor, as in many of the hill and upland
regions, new areas were opened up to shifting cultivation or nomadic
grazing. Under conditions of rapid population growth, the limits to the
resource exploitation model were often quickly realized. Crop yields
were typically low measured in terms of output per unit of seed rather
than per unit of crop area. Output per hectare and per man-hour tended
to decline except in the delta areas of Egypt and South Asia and in
the wet rice areas of East Asia. In many areas the result was increasing
burden on the peasantry.
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Agriculture carried on within the framework of the resource exploita
tion model was, in most parts of the world, capable of supporting only
very limited urban concentrations trading centers and seats of govern
ment. Most food was consumed in the village in which it was produc
ed. Much of the surplus that did become available was extracted from
the village by the landlords in the form of rents, and by the church in
the form of tithes. The limited surplus that could be accumulated ex
erted a decisive impact on political organizations. Charlemagne's cam
paigns against the Germans to extend his Prankish kingdom could not
be waged until early summer. The great heavy horses that carried his
armed knights had to be out on grass, after a winter on poor feed, long
enough to get in condition.
There are relatively few remaining areas of the world where develop
ment along the lines of the resource exploitation model will represent
an efficient source of growth during the last two decades of the twen
tieth century. The 1960s saw the "closing of the frontier" in most areas
of Southeast Asia. In Latin American and Africa, the opening up of
new lands awaits development of technologies for the control of pests
and diseases (such as the tsetse fly in Africa) or for the release and
maintenance of productivity of problem soils. The decline in food pro
duction that has been experienced in many African countries over the
last several decades is an insistent reminder that agricultural growth
along the lines described by the resource exploitation model is no longer
a reliable source of growth in food production.
The Conservation Model
The conservation model of agricultural development evolved from
the advances in crop and livestock husbandry associated with the English
agricultural revolution and the notions of soil exhaustion suggested by
the early German chemists and soil scientists. It was reinforced by the
application to land of the concept, developed in the English classical
school of economics, of diminishing returns to labor and capital.
Until well into the twentieth century, the conservation model of
agricultural development was the only approach to intensification of
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agricultural production available to most of the world's farmers. Its ap
plication is effectively illustrated by the development of the wet rice
culture systems that emerged in East and Southeast Asia and by the laborand land-intensive systems of integrated crop-livestock husbandry which
increasingly characterized European agriculture during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.
During the English agricultural revolution, more intensive crop rota
tion systems replaced the open-three-field system in which arable land
was allocated between permanent cropland and permanent pasture. This
involved the introduction and more intensive use of new forage and green
manure crops and an increase in the availability and use of animal
manures. This "new husbandry" permitted the intensification of croplivestock production through the recycling of plant nutrients, in the form
of animal manures, to maintain soil fertility. The inputs used in this
conservation system of farming the plant nutrients, animal power, land
improvements, physical capital, and agricultural labor force were large
ly produced or supplied by the agricultural sector itself.
Agricultural development, within the framework of the conservation
model, clearly was capable in many parts of the world of sustaining
rates of growth in agricultural production in the range of 1.0 percent
per year over relatively long periods of time. The most serious recent
effort to develop agriculture within this framework was made by the
People's Republic of China in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It became
readily apparent, however, that the feasible growth rates, even with
a rigorous recycling effort, were not compatible with modern rates of
growth in the demand for agricultural output which typically fall inthe 3-5 percent range in the less developed countries (LDCs). The con
servation model remains an important source of productivity growth
in most poor countries and an inspiration to agrarian fundamentalists
and the organic farming movement in the developed countries.

The Location Model
Initially, the location model was formulated in Germany by J.H. von
Thiinen to explain geographic variations in the intensity of farming
systems and the productivity of labor in an industralizing society. In
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the United States, it was extended to explain the more effective perfor
mance of the input and product markets in regions of rapid urbanindustrial development than in regions of slower urban-industrial
development. In the 1950s, interest in the location model reflected con
cern with the failure of agricultural resource development and price
policies, adopted in the 1930s, to remove the persistent regional
disparities in agricultural productivity and rural incomes in the United
States.
The rationale for this model was developed in terms of more effec
tive input and product markets in areas of rapid urban-industrial develop
ment. Industrial development stimulated agricultural development by
expanding the demand for farm products, supplying the industrial in
puts needed to improve agricultural productivity, and drawing away
surplus labor from agriculture. The empirical tests of the location model
have confirmed repeatedly that a strong nonfarm labor market is a prere
quisite for labor productivity in agriculture and improved incomes for
rural people.
The policy implications of the location model appear to be most rele
vant for less developed regions of highly industrialized countries or lag
ging regions of the more rapidly growing LDCs. Agricultural develop
ment policies based on this model appear to be particularly inappropriate
in those countries where the "pathological" growth of urban centers
is a result of population pressures in rural areas running ahead of employ
ment growth in urban areas.
The Diffusion Model
The diffusion of better husbandry practices was a major source of
productivity growth even in premodem societies. The diffusion of crops
and animals from the new world to the old potatoes, maize, cassava,
rubber and from the old world to the new sugar, wheat, and domestic
livestock was an important by-product of the voyages of discovery
and trade from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries.
Diffusion of crops and animals had historically proceeded as a by
product of trade, discovery and migration. The diffusion of maize to
the Old World is an example. Within a decade after Columbus had first
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displayed Indian Cora (maize) at the Spanish court, it was being grown
in the Po Valley in Northern Italy. In that relatively short time it had
diffused from Spain and across North Africa to Turkey and was brought
to the Po Valley by Venetian traders.
By the latter part of the nineteenth century, all major agricultural na
tions were actively engaged in organized crop exploration and introduc
tion. The famous trip of Captain Bligh to the South Pacific, described
in the book and the film, Mutiny on the Bounty, was undertaken as a
crop exploration mission. His assignment was to bring back breadfruit
seedlings and wild sugarcane cultivars.
Botanical gardens were established by the great colonial powers
primarily to serve as crop introduction stations. The diffusion of rub
ber from Brazil to Southeast Asia illustrates their role. When the pro
cess of vulcanization was invented making it possible to produce such
desirable products as rubber boots, raincoats and tyres the price of
natural rubber, produced from wild trees in the Amazon basin of Brazil,
skyrocketed. Brazil made it illegal to export either rubber seeds or rubber
plants. The British sent a botanical expedition to Brazil with the osten
sible purpose of collecting plants that had medicinal value, but they also
brought back rubber seeds. The seeds were first sprouted at the Royal
Botanical Garden at Kew. The seedlings were then transferred to the
botanical gardens at Kandy (Ceylon) and in Singapore. The Kandy seed
lings died but the Singapore seedlings lived and became the foundation
stock of the rubber industry in Southeast Asia.
In the early post-World War n period, the diffusion model provided
the intellectual foundation for technical assistance to developing coun
tries. President Truman talked about American "know-how showhow." The naive diffusion approach drew on the empirical observa
tion of substantial differences in land and labor productivity among
farmers and regions. The route to agricultural development in this view
was through more effective dissemination of technical knowledge and
the narrowing of productivity differences.
The diffusion model has provided the major intellectual foundation
of much of the research and extension effort in farm management and
production economics since the emergence, in the latter years of the
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nineteenth century, of agricultural economics and rural sociology as
separate subdisciplines linking the agricultural and the social sciences.
Developments leading to the establishment of active programs of farm
management research and extension occurred at a time when experi
ment station research was making only a modest contribution to
agricultural productivity growth. A further contribution to the effec
tive diffusion of known technology was provided by rural sociologists'
research on the diffusion process. Models were developed emphasiz
ing the relationship between diffusion rates and the personality
characteristics and educational accomplishments of farm operators.
Insights into the dynamics of the diffusion process, when coupled with
the observation of wide agricultural productivity gaps among developed
and less developed countries and a presumption of inefficient resource
allocation among "irrational, tradition-bound" peasants, produced an
extension or diffusion bias in the choice of agricultural development
strategy in many LDCs during the 1950s. During the 1960s, the limita
tions of the diffusion on technology transfer model as a foundation for
the design of agricultural development policies became increasingly ap
parent as technical assistance and rural development programs based
explicitly or implicitly on this model failed to generate either rapid
modernization of traditional farms and communities or rapid growth
in agricultural output. There were very few opportunities to generate
large productivity gains through the transfer of technology from one
agroclimatic zone to another, or even among regions in the same
agroclimatic zone. The pipeline was empty!
The High-Payoff Input Model
The inadequacy of policies based on the conservation, urban-industrial
impact, and diffusion models led, in the 1960s, to a new perspective:
The key to transforming a traditional agricultural sector into a produc
tive source of economic growth is investment designed to make modern,
high-payoff inputs available to farmers in poor countries. Peasants in
traditional agricultural systems were viewed as rational, efficient resource
allocators.
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In Transforming Traditional Agriculture, T.W. Schultz insisted that
peasants in traditional societies remained poor because there were only
limited technical and economic opportunities to which they could re
spond. The new, high-payoff inputs were classified according to three
categories: (1) the capacity of public and private sector research institu
tions to produce new technical knowledge; (2) the capacity of the in
dustrial sector to develop, produce, and market new technical inputs;
and (3) the capacity of farmers to acquire new knowledge and use new
inputs effectively.
The enthusiasm with which the high-payoff input model has been ac
cepted and translated into economic doctrine has been due in part to
the proliferation of studies reporting high rates of return to public in
vestment in agricultural research (table 1). It was also due to the suc
cess of efforts to develop new, high-productivity grain varieties suitable
for the tropics. New, high-yield wheat varieties were developed in Mex
ico beginning in the 1950s, and new, high-yield rice varieties were
developed in the Philippines in the 1960s. These varieties were highly
responsive to industrial inputs such as fertilizer and other chemicals
and to more effective soil and water management. The high returns
associated with the adoption of the new varieties and the associated
technical inputs and management practices have led to rapid growth
in investment in agricultural research and to the development and adop
tion of the new and more productive crop varieties among farmers in
a number of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
But the acceptance of the high-payoff input model has been incomplete.
Many countries have not yet freed their private sector to produce and
market the new technical inputs that enhance productivity. Those are
functions which the public sector typically performs poorly. The con
straints placed on market development continue to deprive farmers and
consumers of the gains from new technology that are becoming available.
There has been even greater reluctance, in a number of developing
countries, to accept the implication of the high-payoff input model for
the schooling of farm people. The intellectuals and planners in many
developing countries find it difficult to understand the importance, for
agricultural development, of a literate and a numerate peasantry. When
advances in agricultural technology occurred slowly, the apprenticeship
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mode of learning, without formal schooling, from family and village
elders was adequate. But when a continuous stream of new biological
and mechanical technology becomes available the returns to the acquisi
tion of new skills in production and marketing are driven up. It becomes
important not only to accept but also to be able to adapt or reject the
new "packages" of practices and inputs being recommended by research
and extension services. Agricultural extension services themselves must
be able to advance beyond simply recommending a package of prac
tices or delivering technological and managerial messages to farmers.
They must advance from teaching practices to teaching principles!
It seems quite clear that Pakistan has not yet made the investment
in the schooling of rural people to enable it to take full advantage of
the potentially high-payoff technology that is becoming available. In
spite of one of the world's great pieces of agricultural real estate 35
million acres of irrigated land in the Indus basin yields remain low
by Asian standards. It is hard to avoid a conclusion that underinvest
ment in human capital has dampened the rate of return to investment
in land and water development and to agricultural research and extension.

Induced Technical Change in Agriculture
The high-payoff input model remains incomplete as a theory of
agricultural development. Typically, education and research are public
goods not traded through the marketplace. The mechanism by which
resources are allocated among education, research, and other public
and private sector economic activities was not fully incorporated into
the model. It does not explain how economic conditions induce the
development and adoption of an efficient set of technologies for a par
ticular society. Nor does it attempt to specify the processes by which
input and product price relationships induce investment in research in
a direction consistent with a nation's particular resource endowments.
These limitations in the high-payoff input model led Yujiro Hay ami
and I to develop a model of agricultural development in which technical
change is treated as an exogenous factor. This induced innovation

Table 1
Summary Studies of Agricultural Research Productivity
Study
Index number:
Griliches, 1958
Griliches, 1958
Peterson, 1967
Evenson, 1969
Barletta, 1970
Barletta, 1970
Ayer, 1970
Schmitz and Seckler, 1970

Commodity

Country
USA
USA
USA
South Africa
Mexico
Mexico
Brazil
USA

Ayer and Schuh, 1972
Mines, 1972

Brazil
Peru

Hayami and Akino, 1977
Hayami and Akino, 1977
Hertford, Ardila, Rocha
and Trujillo, 1977

Japan
Japan
Colombia

Pee, 1977
Peterson and
Fitzharris, 1977

Malaysia
USA

00

Time
period

Hybrid corn
Hybrid sorghum
Poultry
Sugarcane
Wheat
Maize
Cotton
Tomato harvester, with no compensation
to displaced workers
Tomato harvester, with compensation to
displaced workers for 50% of earnings loss
Cotton
Maize

1940-1955
1940-1957
1915-1960
1945-1962
1943-1963
1943-1963
1924-1967
1958-1969

Rice
Rice
Rice
Soybeans
Wheat
Cotton
Rubber
Aggregate

1915-1950
1930-1961
1957-1972
1960-1971
1953-1973
1953-1972
1932-1973
1937-1942
1947-1952
1957-1962
1957-1972

Annual internal
rate of return
(%)
35-40
20
21-25
40
90
35
77 +
37-46

1924-1967
1954-1967

16-28
77-110
35-40a
50-55b
25-27
73-75
60-82
79-96
11-12
none
24
50
51
49
34

S

Wennergren and
Whitaker, 1977
Pray, 1978

Scobie and Posada, 1978
Pray, 1980
Regression analysis:
Tang, 1963
Griliches, 1964
Latimer, 1964
Peterson
Evenson, 1968
Evenson, 1969
Barletta, 1970
Duncan, 1972
Evenson and Jha, 1973
Cline, 1975 (revised by
Knudson & Tweeten, 1979)

Bredahl and Peterson, 1976

Bolivia
Punjab
(British India)
Punjab
(Pakistan)
Bolivia
Bangladesh

Japan
USA
USA
USA
USA
South Africa
Mexico
Australia
India
USA

USA

Sheep
Wheat
Agricultural research and extension

1966-1975
1966-1975

44
-48

1906-1956

34-44

1948-1963
1957-1964
1961-1977

23-37
79-96
30-35

1880-1938
1949-1959
1949-1959
1915-1960
1949-1959
1945-1958
1943-1963
1948-1969
1953-1971
1939-1948
1949-1958
1959-1968
1969-1972
1969
1969
1969
1969

35
35-40
not significant
21
47
40
45-93
58-68
40
41-50C
39-47c
32-39c
28-35c
36d

Agricultural research and extension
Rice
Wheat and rice

Aggregate
Aggregate
Aggregate
Poultry
Aggregate
Sugarcane
Crops
Pasture improvement
Aggregate
Aggregate
Research and extension

Cash grains
Poultry
Dairy
Livestock

._3

?cr

37d
43d
47d

1

n
OQ
O»

Table 1 (continued)

Kahion, Bal, Saxena
and Jha, 1977
Evenson and Flores, 1978

Flores, Evenson, and
Hayami, 1978
Nagy and Furtan, 1978
Davis, 1979
Evenson, 1979

Commodity

Country

Study

Time
period

Annual internal
rate of return
(%)
63

India

Aggregate

1960-1961

Asia-National

Rice

Asia-International
Tropics
Philippines
Canada
USA

Rice
Rice
Rice
Rapeseed
Aggregate

USA
USA
USA
USA
Southern USA
Northern USA
Western USA
USA

Aggregate
Technology oriented
Science oriented
Science oriented
Technology oriented
Technology oriented
Technology onented
Farm management research and agricultural
extension

1950-1965
1966-1975
1966-1975
1966-1975
1966-1975
1960-1975
1949-1959
1964-1974
1868-1926
1927-1950
1927-1950
1948-1971
1948-1971
1948-1971
1948-1971

32-39
73-78
74-102
46-71
75
95-110
66-100
37
65
95
110
45
130
93
95

1948-1971

110

SOURCE: Robert E. Evenson, Paul E. Waggoner, and Vernon W. Ruttan, "Economic Benefits from Research- An Example from Agriculture," Science,
205 (September 14, 1979), pp. 1101-7. Copyright 1979 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
a. Returns to maize research only.
b. Returns to maize research plus cultivation "package."
c. Lower estimate for 13-, and higher for 16-year time lag between beginning and end of output impact.
d. Lagged marginal product of 1969 research on output discounted for an estimated mean lag of 5 years for cash grains, 6 years for poultry and dairy,
and 7 years for livestock.
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perspective was stimulated by historical evidence that different coun
tries had followed alternative paths of technical change in the process
of agricultural development. In the induced innovation model, changes
or differences in the economic environment influence the direction of
technical change.
In discussing the induced innovation Model, I will find it useful, at
the risk of some oversimplification, to use the term mechanical
technology to refer to those technologies which substitute for labor and
the term biological technology to refer to those technologies which
generate increases in output per hectare.

Mechanical and Biological Processes
in Agricultural Production
The mechanization of agricultural production cannot be treated as
simply an adaptation of industrial methods of production to agriculture.
The spatial nature of agricultural production results in significant dif
ferences between agriculture and industry in patterns of machine use.
It imposes severe limits on the efficiency of large scale production in
agriculture.
The spatial dimension of crop production requires that the machines
suitable for agricultural production must be mobile they must move
across or through materials that are immobile in contrast to moving
material through stationary machines as in most industrial processes.
Furthermore, the seasonal or spatial characteristics of agricultural pro
duction require a series of specialized machines for land preparation,
planting, weed control and harvesting specifically designed for sequen
tial operations, each of which is carried out for only a few days or weeks
in each season. This means that it is no more feasible for workers to
specialize in one operation in mechanized agriculture than in
premechanized agriculture. It also means that in a "fully mechanized"
agricultural system, the capital-labor ratio tends to be much higher than
in the industrial sector in the same country.
In agriculture, biological and chemical processes are more fundamental
than mechanization or machine processes. This generalization was

22 Ruttan

equally true during the last century as it will be during the era of the
"new biotechnology." Advances in biological and chemical technology
in crop production have typically involved one or more of the follow
ing three elements: (a) land and water resource development to pro
vide a more satisfactory environment for plant growth; (b) modifica
tion of the environment by the addition of organic and inorganic sources
of plant nutrients to the soil to stimulate plant growth; (c) use of
biological and chemical means to protect plants from pests and disease;
and (d) selection and design of new biologically efficient crop varieties
specifically adapted to respond to those elements in the environment
that are subject to man's control. Similar processes can be observed
in advances in animal agriculture.
The United States and Japan
One implication of the discussion of mechanical and biological pro
cesses is that there are multiple paths of technical change in agriculture
available to a society. The constraints imposed by an inelastic supply
of land may be offset by advances in biological technology. The con
straints imposed by an inelastic supply of labor may be offset by ad
vances in mechanical technology. These alternatives are illustrated in
figure 1. The 1880-1980 land and labor productivity growth paths for
Japan, Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United
States are plotted, along with the 1980 productivity ratios for a number
of developing countries. The impression given by the several growth
paths is that nature is relatively "plastic."
In economics, it has generally been accepted, at least since the publica
tion of Theory of Wages by Sir John Hicks, that changes or differences
in the relative prices of factors of production could influence the direc
tion of invention or innovation. There has also been a second tradition,
based on the work of Griliches and Schmookler, that has focused at
tention on the influence of growth in product demand on the rate of
technical change. We now turn to an illustration of the role of relative
factor endowments and prices in the evolution of alternative paths of
technical change in agriculture in the United States and Japan.
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Figure 1 Historical growth paths of agricultural productivity of Denmark,
France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States for
1880-1980, compared with intercountry cross-section observations
of selected countries in 1980. Values in parentheses are percent of
male workers employed in nonagriculture. Data from Appendixes
A and B, Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural Development, rev. ed.,
1985.
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Japan and the United States are characterized by extreme differences
in relative endowments of land and labor (table 2). In 1880, total
agricultural land area per male worker was more than 60 times as large
in the United States as in Japan, and arable land area per worker was
about 20 times as large in the United States as in Japan. The differences
have widened over time. By 1980, total agricultural land area per male
worker was more than 100 times as large and arable land area per male
worker about 50 times as large in the United States as in Japan.
The relative prices of land and labor also differed sharply in the two
countries. In 1880 in order to buy a hectare of arable land (compare
row 8 and row 16 in table 2), it would have been necessary for a Japanese
hired farm worker to work eight times as many days as a U.S. farm
worker. In the United States, the price of labor rose relative to the price
of land, particularly between 1880 and 1920. In Japan, the price of land
rose sharply relative to the price of labor, particularly between 1880
and 1900. By 1960 a Japanese farm worker would have had to work
30 times as many days as a U.S. farm worker in order to buy one hec
tare of arable land. This gap was reduced after 1960, partly due to ex
tremely rapid increases in wage rates in Japan during the two decades
of "miraculous" economic growth. In the United States, land prices
rose sharply in the postwar period primarily because of the rising de
mand for land for nonagricultural use and the anticipation of continued
inflation. Yet, in 1980 a Japanese farm worker still would have had
to work 11 times as many days as a U.S. worker to buy one hectare
of land.
In spite of these substantial differences in land area per worker and
in the relative prices of land and labor, both the United States and Japan
experienced relatively rapid rates of growth in production and produc
tivity in agriculture (tables 3 and 4). Overall agricultural growth per
formance for the entire 100-year period was very similar in the two
countries. In both countries, total agricultural output increased at an
annual compound rate of 1.6 percent, while total inputs (aggregate of
conventional inputs) increased at a rate of 0.7 percent. Total factor pro
ductivity (total output divided by total input) increased at an annual rate
of 0.9 percent in both countries. Meanwhile, labor productivity measured
by agricultural output per male worker increased at rates of 3.1 per-

Table 2
Land-Labor Endowments and Relative Prices in Agriculture
United States and Japan, Selected years

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)

USA
Agricultural land area (million ha.)
Arable land area (million ha.)
No. of male farm workers (thousand)
(l)/(3) (ha./worker)
(2)/(3) (ha./worker)
Value of arable land ($/ha.)
Farm wage rate ($/day)
(6)/(7) (days/ha.)
Japan
Agricultural land area (thousand ha.)a
Arable land area (thousand ha.)
No. of male farm workers (thousand)
(9)/(ll) (ha./worker)
(10)/(11) (ha./worker)
Value of arable land (yen/ha.)
Farm wage rate (yen/day)
(14)/(15) (days/ha.)

1880

1900

1920

1940

327
93
7,959
41
12
109
0.90
188

465
157
9,880
47
16
106
1.00
106

458
194
10,221
45
19
341
3.30
103

452
189
8,487
50
22
178
1.60
111

440
185
3,973
111
47
696
6.60
105

427
191
1,792
238
107
3,393
25.31
134

5,509
4,749
8,336
0.66
0.57
343
0.22
1,559

6,032
5,200
8,483
0.71
0.61
917
0.31
2,958

6,958
5,998
7,577
0.92
0.79
3,882
1.39
2,793

7,102
6,122
6,362
1.12
0.96
4,709
1.90
2,478

7,042
6,071
6,230
1.13
0.97
1,415,000
440
3,216

5,729
5,461
2,674
2.14
2.04
7,642,000
5,054
1,512

1960

1980

SOURCE: Data from Appendix Tables C-2 and C-3 in Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective,
rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).
a. Agricultural land areas in Japan for 1880-1960 are estimated by multiplying arable land areas by 1.16, the ratio of agricultural land area to arable
land area in the 1960 Census of Agriculture; this conversion factor changed to 1.05 for 1980 based on the 1980 Census of Agriculture.
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Table 3
Average Annual Rates of Change (Percentage per Year)
in Output, Inputs, and Productivity in U.S. Agriculture, 1870-1979
Item

1870-1900

1900-1925

1925-1950

1950-1965

1965-1982

Farm output
Total inputs
Total productivity

2.9
1.9
1.0

0.9
1.1
-0.2

1.6
0.2
1.3

1.7
-0.4
2.2

2.1
0.2
1.8

Labor inputsa
Labor productivity

1.6
1.3

0.5
0.4

-1.7
3.3

-4.8
6.6

-3.4
5.8

Land inputs**
Land productivity

3.1
-0.2

0.8
0.0

0.1
1.4

-0.9
2.6

0.0
1.8

SOURCES: Data from USDA, Changes in Farm Production and Efficiency (Washington, D.C. 1979); and D.D. Durost and G.T. Barton, Changing
Sources of Farm Output (Washington, D.C.: USDA Production Research Report No. 36, February 1960). Data are three-year averages centered on
the year shown for 1925, 1950 and 1965.
a. Number of workers, 1870-1910; worker-hour basis, 1910-1971.
b. Cropland use for crops, including crop failures and cultivated summer fallow.

Table 4
Average Annual Change in Total Output, Inputs, and Productivity in Japanese Agriculture, 1880-1980
Item

1880-1920

1920-1935

1935-1955

1955-1980

1965-1982

Farm output
Total inputs
Total productivity

1.8
0.5
1.3

0.9
0.5
0.4

0.6
1.2
-0.6

3.5
1.3
2.2

1.2
0.7
0.5

Labor inputs
Labor productivity

-0.3
2.1

-0.2
1.1

0.6
0.0

-2.5
6.0

-3.7
4.9

Land inputs
Land productivity

0.6
1.2

0.1
0.8

-0.1
0.7

0.1
3.4

-0.6
1.8

SOURCES: Data from Saburo Yamada and Yujiro Hayami, "Agricultural Growth in Japan, 1880-1970," in Agricultural Growth m Japan, Taiwan,
Korea and the Philippines, Yujiro Hayami, Vernon W. Ruttan and Herman Southworth, eds. (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979), pp. 33-58;
Saburo Yamada, "The Secular Trends m Input-Output Relations of Agricultural Production in Japan, 1878-1978," a paper presented at the Conference
of Agricultural Development in China, Japan, and Korea, Academica Siruca, Taipel, December 17-20, 1980, Saburo Yamada, Country Study on Agricultural
Productivity Measurement and Analysis - Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Institute of Oriental Culture, October 1984, mimeo).
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cent per year in the United States and 2.7 percent in Japan. It is
remarkable that the overall growth rates in output and productivity were
so similar, despite the extremely different factor proportions that
characterize the two countries.
Although there is a resemblance in the overall rates of growth in pro
duction and productivity, the time sequences of the relatively fastgrowing phases and the relatively stagnant phases differ between the
two countries. In the United States, agricultural output grew rapidly
up to 1900; then the growth rate decelerated. From the 1900s to the
1930s there was little gain in total productivity. This stagnation phase
was succeeded by a dramatic rise in production and productivity in the
1940s and 1950s. Japan experienced rapid increases in agricultural pro
duction and productivity from 1880 to the 1910s, then entered into a
stagnation phase, which lasted until the mid-1930s. Another rapid ex
pansion phase commenced during the period of recovery from the
devastation of World War n. Roughly speaking, the United States ex
perienced a stagnation phase two decades earlier than Japan and also
shifted to the second development phase two decades earlier.
The effect of relative prices on the development and choice of
technology is illustrated with remarkable clarity for biological technology
in figure 2. In figure 2, U.S. and Japanese data on the relationship be
tween fertilizer input per hectare of arable land and the fertilizer/land
price ratio are plotted for the period 1880 to 1980. In both 1880 and
1980, U.S. farmers were using less fertilizer than Japanese farmers.
Despite enormous differences in both physical and institutional resources,
however, the relationship between these variables has been almost iden
tical in the two countries. As the price of fertilizer declined relative
to other factors, scientists in both countries responded by inventing crop
varieties that were more responsive to the lower prices of fertilizer.
American scientists, however, always lagged behind the Japanese by
several decades because the lower prices of land relative to the price
of fertilizer in the United States resulted in a lower priority being plac
ed on yield-increasing technology.
The effect of changes in the relative prices of mechanical power and
labor in the United States and Japan for 1880-1980 is illustrated in figure
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Figure 2 Relation between fertilizer input per hectare of arable land and
fertilizer-arable land price ratio (=hectares of arable land which can
be purchased by one ton of N+P2O5 +K2O contained in commer
cial fertilizers), the United Sates and Japan, quinquennial observa
tions for 1880-1980. Data from Appendix C, Hay ami and Ruttan,
Agricultural Development, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1985).

30 Ruttan

3. In both 1880 and 1980, U.S. farmers were using more mechanical
power than Japanese farmers. The relationship between the power-labor
price ratio and the use of power per worker is almost identical in the
two countries, but because labor was always less expensive in Japan,
the Japanese suppliers of mechanical technology always lagged behind
U.S. suppliers by several decades. These same relationships that hold
for Japan and the United States have now been demonstrated for the
period 1880-1960 for a number of European countries in the book by
Hans P. Binswanger and Veraon W. Ruttan, Induced Innovation:
Technology, Institutions and Development.
The effect of a rise in the price of fertilizer relative to the price of
land or in the price of labor relative to the price of machinery has been
to induce advances in biological and mechanical technology. The ef
fect of the introduction of lower cost and more productive biological
and mechanical technology has been to induce farmers to substitute fer
tilizer for land and mechanical power for labor. These responses to dif
ferences in resource endowments among countries and to changes in
resource endowments over time by agricultural research institutions,
by the farm supply industries, and by farmers, has been remarkably
similar in spite of differences in cultures and traditions.
The results of our comparative analyses can be summarized as follows:
Agricultural growth in the United States and Japan during the period
1880-1980 can best be understood when viewed as a dynamic factor
substitution process. Factors have been substituted for each other along
a metaproduction function in response to long-run trends in relative factor
prices. Each point on the metaproduction surface is characterized by
a technology which can be described in terms of specific sources of
power, types of machinery, crop varieties, and animal breeds.
Movements along this metaproduction surface involve technical changes.
These technical changes have been induced to a significant extent by
the long-term trends in relative factor prices.
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Figure 3 Relation between farm draft power per male worker and power-labor
price ratio (=hectares of work days which can be purchased by one
horsepower of tractor or draft animal), the United States and Japan,
quinquennial observations for 1880-1980. Data from Appendix C,
Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural Development, rev. ed. Number
of male workers=U3 and J3, Power=U7+U8 and J7+J8, Land
price=U 19 and J19, Power price=average retail price of tractor
per horsepower extrapolated by U21 from the 1976-80 average of
$216 for the United States, and extrapolated by J21 from the average
of 65,170 yen for Japan
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Perspective
In the closing decades of the twentieth century we are approaching
the end of the most remarkable transitions in the history of agriculture.
Prior to the beginning of this century, almost all increases in
agricultural production occurred as a result of increases in area cultivated.
The major exceptions were in Western Europe, where livestock-based
conservation systems of farming had developed, and in East Asia, where
wet rice cultivation systems had developed.
But by the end of this century there will be few significant areas where
agricultural production can be expanded by simply adding more land
to production. Expansion of agricultural output will have to be obtain
ed almost entirely from more intensive cultivation of the areas already
being used for agricultural production. Increases in food and fiber pro
duction will depend, in large measure, on continuous advances in
agricultural technology.
The task before us is clear. It is imperative, over the next several
decades, that we complete the establishment of agricultural research
capacity for each commodity of economic significance in each
agroclimatic region of the world.
A developing country which fails to evolve a capacity for technical
and institutional innovation in agriculture consistent with its resource
and cultural endowments suffers two major constraints on its attempts
to develop a productive agriculture. It is unable to take advantage of
advances in biological and chemical technologies suited to labor-intensive
agricultural systems. And the mechanical technology it does import from
more developed countries will be productive only under conditions of
large-scale agricultural organization. It will contribute to the emergence
of a "bimodal" rather than a "unimodal" organization structure.
During the last two decades a number of developing countries have
begun to establish the institutional capacity to generate technical changes
adapted to national and regional resource endowments. More recently,
these emerging national systems have been buttressed by a new system
of international crop and animal research institutes. These new institutes
have become both important soures of new knowledge and technology
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and increasingly effective communication links among the developing
national research systems.
The lag in shifting from a natural resource-based to a science-based
system of agriculture continues to be a source of national differences
in land and labor productivity. Lags in the development and applica
tion of knowledge are also important sources of regional productivity
differences within countries. In countries such as Mexico and Pakistan,
differential rates of technical change have been an important source of
the widening disparities in the rate of growth of total agricultural out
put, in labor and land productivity, and in incomes and wage rates among
regions.
Productivity differences in agriculture are increasingly a function of
investments in scientific and industrial capacity and in the education
of rural people rather than of natural resource endowments. The ef
fects of education on productivity are particularly important during
periods in which a nation's agricultural research system begins to in
troduce new technology. In an agricultural system characterized by static
technology, there are few gains to be realized from education in rural
areas. Rural people who have lived for generations with essentially the
same resources and the same technology have learned from long ex
perience what their efforts can get out of the resources available to them.
Children acquire from their parents the skills that are worthwhile. For
mal schooling has little economic value in agricultural production.
As soon as new technical opportunities become available, this situa
tion changes. Technical change requires the acquisition of new husbandry
skills; acquisition from nontraditional sources of additional resources
such as new seeds, new chemicals, and new equipment; and develop
ment of new skills in dealing with both natural resources and with the
input and product market institutions that link agriculture with the
nonagricultural sector.
The processes by which new knowledge can be applied to alter the
rate and direction of technical change in agriculture, are, however,
substantially greater than our knowledge of the processes by which
resources are brought to bear on the process of institutional innovation
and transfer. Yet the need for viable institutions capable of supporting
more rapid agricultural growth and rural development is even more com
pelling today than a decade ago.

The Political Economy
of
Agricultural and Rural Development
Bruce F. Johnston
Stanford University

The term political economy went out of fashion decades ago because
economists wanted to concentrate on rigorous analysis of the strictly
economic aspects of problems. The term has come back in favor,
however, for many of us concerned with problems of development. We
recognize that we simply cannot afford to ignore the political dimen
sion that is so important to our understanding of the real world
problems and opportunities. LasswelTs classic definition of politics
who gets what, when, and how? is also a fine definition of the political
economy of development. In brief, political constraints are as impor
tant as the scarcity of economic resources in determining those things
that are feasible and not merely desirable.
In addressing this large topic, I want to deal in summary fashion with
three key questions.
My first question is, simply, why focus on agricultural and rural
development?
Second, why should we in this country be concerned about the develop
ment problems of Kenya, India, and other third world countries?
Third, what have economists in general and this particular
agricultural economist learned in the last 40 years about the critical
elements or ingredients of successful strategies for agricultural and rural
development?
I can deal quickly with the first question: Why the focus on agricultural
and rural development?
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For the less-developed countries that still have very low incomes
the Indias, Kenyas, or Indonesias in contrast with middle-income coun
tries such as South Korea, Brazil, or Taiwan, some 60 to 80 percent
of the population and labor force still depend on agriculture for their
livelihood for employment and income. 1 And it is not necessary to
dwell on the fact that food is one of the most basic of * 'Basic Human
Needs." (See Mellor and Johnston 1984.)
On my second question, as to why we as Americans should be con
cerned about the development problems of third world countries, there
are many answers. Let me mention two that I find persuasive.
The first answer boils down to this: We are part of the problem and
therefore have a moral, a human obligation to try to be part of the solu
tion. The most obvious way in which we are part of the problem is
that we the U.S., the countries of Western Europe, and the World
Health Organization and other international institutions (including the
Kellogg, Rockefeller, and Ford Foundations) are mainly responsible
for the explosive growth rates of population that became universal among
the less-developed countries during the decades following World War
n. I am referring, of course, to the opening up of access to immuniza
tion programs and other modern public health technologies and to modern
medical knowledge. This lowering of death rates above all by reduc
ing infant and child mortality has been a blessing for the families that
have been spared the wastage of human life when, as was often the case,
one out of three infants died before the age of five. Like many transfers
of modern technology, however, it has been a two-edged sword. We
have learned that it is much easier for external interventions to bring
about a rapid reduction in death rates than in birth rates. Clearly, it
is the dramatic decline in death rates from crude death rates of 40 to
50 per thousand to current levels of 10 to 25 per thousand that has
given rise to the explosive growth of population of the past 35 years.
(Johnston and Clark 1982, pp. 47-60.)
Again, this is a problem that applies particularly to the low-income
countries. It also applies with special force to the countries of tropical
Africa and not only because so many of the low-income countries are
in the region. In fact, tropical Africa is the one region in the world where
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rates of population growth are continuing to increase because death rates
are continuing to fall and birth rates are virtually unchanged.
The situation in Kenya epitomizes the way in which the task of rais
ing per capita incomes has been made exceedingly difficult because of
the emergence and persistence of very high rates of population growth.
During the demographic transition in Western Europe and Japan, the
period of rapid population growth was charaterized by rates of increase
of about 1.5 percent, compared to an estimated rate of 4 percent in
Kenya. It is the nature of population growth to proceed at a compound
rate. An upsurge in infant and child survival this year means an up
surge in the rate of increase in women of child-bearing age beginning
15 to 20 years from now. Hence the momentum of population growth
that demographers emphasize. A growth rate of 4 percent means that
a population will double in just over 17 years and will increase seven
times in 50 years. At first glance, a population growth rate of 2 percent
doesn't seem all that different a population doubling time of 35 years
instead of 17. But continuation of a 2 percent compound rate for 50
years implies an increase of' 'only" 2.7 times compared to a sevenfold
increase with a 4 percent growth rate.
Demographic projections for Kenya offer a striking example. For the
55-year period 1969 to 2024, the "most likely" set of assumptions point
to an increase in Kenya's population from 11 million to 64 million. Those
projections also considered the prospective change in the urban-rural
composition of the country's labor force. Assuming continued rapid
growth of the urban workforce, the rural workforce is projected to
decline from 87 percent of the total in 1969 to 65 percent in 2024. In
spite of the projected sixteen/old increase in the population of working
age in urban areas, however, the rural workforce would still increase
fourfold over that 55-year period (Shah and Willekens 1978). Those
projections emphasize an important structural characteristic of coun
tries with rapid population growth and where the share of the popula
tion dependent on agriculture is still very high.
But before I turn to the implications of these structural/demographic
characteristics on the choice of an agricultural strategy, let me mention

38 Johnston

another fundamental reason why I believe that it is important for the
U.S. to continue to play an important role in providing economic and
technical assistance for the contemporary low-income countries.
Throughout most of human history poverty was widespread, but it was
not perceived as a problem in the way it is today. Instead, it was seen
as part of the natural order. ' 'The poor are always with us." Their plight
should be alleviated by charity, but poverty was not viewed as a condi
tion that could and should be eliminated by well-designed and vigorously
implemented development efforts. However, with the remarkable ad
vances that have been made in science and technology, the develop
ment goal of eliminating poverty has become a real possibility, not mere
ly a Utopian dream. (See Simon 1984.)
I turn now to the question of what economists and this agricultural
economist have learned about the development process during the past
40 years. And that will bring me back to the implications of those struc
tural/demographic characteristics of today's low-income developing
countries.
But first I want to draw on my work in Japan in the years immediate
ly after World War n. With the benefit of a lot of hindsight, I see that
I am very fortunate to have been influenced so strongly by Japan's ex
perience as my implicit "model" of agricultural development. During
the critically formative period of the late 19th century and the early
decades of the 20th century, increases in agricultural productivity con
tributed in some very important ways to the overall economic develop
ment of Japan. (See Ohkawa, Johnston, and Kaneda 1969; Johnston
and Kilby 1975, chap. 5.) Three features of that experience were
especially significant.
1. Agricultural production was increased within the unchanged
organizational framework of Japan's existing small-scale farming system.
Between 1880 and 1960, Japan's agricultural production increased about
3-1/2 times, slightly more than the increase in the U.S. over the same
80-year period. Because of technological change, specifically increases
in the productivity of the existing on-farm resources of land and labor,
this was achieved with remarkably small demands on the critically scarce
resources of capital and foreign exchange.
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2. Most of the nation's farmers were involved in increases in
agricultural productivity associated with the use of improved crop
varieties, fertilizers and other types of working capital but remarkably
little investment in farm machinery or other types of long-term capital
investment. Technological change related to high-yield, fertilizerresponsive crop varieties was the driving force in increasing agricultural
productivity. And the technical innovations and new purchased inputs
were divisible. Therefore they could be used efficiently by small farmers
subject to a severe purchasing power constraint. And the typical farmer
unavoidably faced a purchasing power constraint. The cash income ac
cruing to the agricultural sector was limited because of the struc
tural/demographic characteristics emphasized earlier. When the number
of farm households is still large relative to the domestic population depen
dent on purchased food, the cash income accruing to the average farm
unit is inevitably small. When a country's pattern of agricultural develop
ment is dualistic, so that a relatively small number of atypically large
and capital-intensive farm enterprises account for the lion's share of
commercial production, those large farms escape the purchasing power
constraint. But that is at the expense of intensifying the cash income
and purchasing power constraint for the great majority of small farm
units.
3. Agricultural and industrial growth went forward together in a pro
cess of concurrent growth. As the overwhelmingly agrarian character
of the Japanese economy was gradually transformed by the process of
economic growth, there were positive interactions between agriculture
and industry. Moreover, the concurrent progress in agriculture and in
dustry led to decentralized industrial development of a "semi-modern"
industrial sector that relied upon relatively simple, capital-saving, laborusing technologies, which made possible more rapid growth of output
in both sectors.
I want to dwell particularly on the first and second factors and the
importance of technological change. All of the speakers in this seminar
series are, I believe, in agreement on the great importance of
technological change. This potential importance of technological change
as a source of agricultural growth has some very important implica
tions for the design of development strategies.
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One terribly important implication is that we need to be as concern
ed with investments in human and institutional resources as in physical
investments such as construction of irrigation systems or building fac
tories for manufacturing farm equipment. James Bonnen, a distinguished
professor of agricultural economics at Michigan State University, has
emphasized that agricultural progress in the U.S. has been the result
of interactions within a system of developmental institutions: farmers
and their organizations, the United States Department of Agriculture
and the land-grant colleges and universities, the Federal-State
Agricultural Research and Extension programs, private sector firms
engaged in the marketing and processing of farm products and the
manufacture and distribution of farm inputs, and the federal and state
political institutions involved in the formulation of agricultural policy.
(See Bonnen 1987.) Experience in the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and many
other countries has demonstrated that efficient agricultural progress
depends on the interacting effects of farm-level factors and what, for
lack of a better term, I refer to as socially determined factors. The farmlevel factors include the responsiveness of farmers to incentives and
their investments of time and money in land improvement, in equip
ment, in fertilizers and other forms of working capital, and in acquir
ing knowledge and skills. The socially determined factors include educa
tional institutions, investments in agricultural research, extension, and
infrastructure, macroeconomic policies (e.g., monetary policy and in
terest rates), and a host of factors affecting the marketing of farm prod
ucts and the distribution of inputs.
The twofold implication of recognizing the great potential importance
of technological change concerns the need for investments in the various
forms of capital physical, human, and institutional to be reasonably
well-balanced. It is easy to state the economic principle. The rate of
return on the last dollar invested in each type of capital should be ap
proximately equal. But to realize that ideal in practice is enormously
difficult. The emphasis by Hayami and Ruttan (1985) on "induced in
novation" and the importance of avoiding price distortions is an im
portant part of the answer. However, the decisions to make the longterm investment in building supporting institutions, including educa
tional institutions to train agricultural scientists and administrators, re-
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quires a vision, even a faith, that goes beyond perceiving trends in
relative prices. Lessons of past historial experience can be enormously
helpful provided that they are well understood and properly interpreted.
I believe that I have been very fortunate to have had an opportunity
to learn about Japan's experience when I was still very young and im
pressionable. Every country confronts a unique set of problems. But
I am persuaded that Japan's past experience is of much greater relevance
to today's developing countries than the historical experience of the
United States.
Another important lesson of past experience concerns the relative ad
vantages of the public and private sectors in achieving successful
agricultural development. The first proposition that I would stress is
that we have to move beyond a doctrinaire faith in either government
planning and direct action by government, or the equally blind faith
in the private sector and "the magic of the market place." Experience
in the U.S., in Japan and in many other countries demonstrates that
successful agricultural development depends on an interacting system
of public and private institutions.
There are good theoretical reasons and much evidence to support the
view that independent private firms have a comparative advantage over
public agencies in carrying out essentially commercial functions such
as production or marketing farm products or distributing farm inputs.
This is essentially because the hierarchical techniques of decisionmaking and operating within a bureaucracy are at a disadvantage as com
pared to the greater flexibility and the capacity and motivation for costminimization that characterize private firms responding to price and
profit signals within a market system. It is equally important to stress,
however, that a number of the socially determined factors that are of
critical importance depend upon the public sector. This is because public
agencies are needed to make available critical public goods such as educa
tion, agricultural research, extension, and family planning services. It
is a defining characteristic of public goods and services that they will
be provided in less than the socially optimal amount if their availability
depends on private firms responding to private demands. Even from
a strictly economic point of view, society's benefits from investing in
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education, for example, exceed the private returns accruing to those
who receive the education.
Finally, I want to make a few comments about the role of food aid.
This is a complex and controversial topic. Some people who stress that
the world's food problems are "merely a matter of distribution" con
clude that sending our "surplus food" is a neat and simple answer.
Food aid shipments are essential for famine relief. They are not the
answer to the fundamental problems of poverty. And it is their poverty
that makes poor countries so vulnerable to famine.
I sympathize with the prime minister who wanted to find a one-handed
economist because he (or was it she?) was fed up with "on the one
hand, on the other hand" answers. But there's no getting away from
the complexity that characterizes food aid. Food aid can be used to pro
mote development. It can and, I believe, often does have adverse ef
fects on incentives to increase food production in a low-income, develop
ing country. But rather than spend a lot of time trying to spell out the
conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for food aid to have a positive
impact, let me give you, as an illustration, my view on the food aid
balance sheet for India. It seems to me that for the 1950s and up to
the mid-1960s, it is difficult to say whether food aid yielded significant
net benefits for India. Its greatest value was probably in saving foreign
exchange that could be used to finance other imports including, for ex
ample, equipment for fertilizer factories and for irrigation facilities.
But its availability undoubtedly had an adverse effect on farm prices
and farmers' incentives. In addition, it probably weakened the resolve
of the government to face up to the country's agricultural problems.
There is no doubt in my mind that dollar-for-dollar the food aid was
less valuable than, say, the investments that enabled some of our landgrant universities to assist in establishing a network of agricultural univer
sities in India and in creating a more effective national agricultural
research system. But that ignores two important political economy dimen
sions of the issue.
First, there is no doubt that to some extent the food aid was addi
tional to other forms of aid. As long as agricultural "surpluses" are
created as a by-product of our agricultural price support programs,
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there is bound to be pressure in Congress to convert those "costly and
burdensome surpluses" into a "valuable food resource." Second, I am
convinced that the blunt way in which Lyndon B. Johnson carried out
his "short tether" policy in making aid available to India during the
acute famine in 1966 and 1967 resulting from two successive years of
drought had powerful and positive consequences. There was great resent
ment among Indian politicians, policymakers, and officials at many levels
at being treated in that way, e.g., in imposing many harsh "conditions
precedent." Indeed the Indians involved were so infuriated that the
episode created a resolve to never again be so dependent on food relief
shipments. And fortunately the prior investments in strengthening In
dia's human and institutional resources as well as U.S. and World Bank
investments in expanding irrigation facilities and fertilizer manufacturing
capacity meant that India's interacting system of developmental institu
tions could meet the challenge of virtually ending India's dependence
on imported food.
In recent years, there has been a very substantial increase in food
aid to countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Johnston et al. 1987, chap. 2). 2
Because of the tight budget situation in the U.S., together with current
concern over the financial difficulties of American farmers as a result
of the recent decline in agricultural exports and in farm prices, there
is pressure to further expand food aid shipments; and exaggerated claims
are being made about the benefits to be realized from such shipments.
(See, for example, Reutlinger and Katona-Apte 1987.) Providing food
aid as a substitute for commercial imports would help to ease the serious
balance-of-payments problems faced by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
As noted by Timmer in his chapter, however, using food aid to replace
commercial imports is contrary to the intent and the regulations that
are supposed to govern food aid programs of the U.S. and other coun
tries. Moreover, sustained solutions to Africa's serious food and
agricultural problems require economic and technical assistance to sup
port the strengthening of national agricultural research systems and
postsecondary educational institutions for training agricultural scien
tists and administrators, together with investments in expanding,
rehabilitating, and maintaining rural transport networks and other rural.
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infrastructure. Use of a certain amount of food aid for rural works pro
jects could have a positive developmental impact, although such pro
jects make substantial demands on scarce administrative and planning
capacity. It is essential to recognize that food aid cannot be a substitute
for supporting the long-term institution-building that is so desperately
needed in Sub-Saharan Africa.

NOTES
1. The distinctive problems of such "late-developing" countries are examined in Johnston and
Kilby (1975) and Johnston and Clark (1982).
2. For historical reasons, Africa has not been the focus of U.S. economic assistance. Since 1978,
U.S. assistance to Africa has amounted to a little over 10 percent of the country's foreign aid
to all regions; but prior to 1978, Africa received only about 5 percent of the total. For the six
countries Senegal.Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi included in the World
Bank's study of Managing Agricultural Development in Africa (MADIA), AID's bilateral assistance
for projects and programs during the period 1963-84 amounted to $905 million in constant 1983
dollars or only a little more than the $836 million provided as food aid (Johnston et al. 1987,
chap. 2, table 3).
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Foreign Assistance
and Agricultural Development
Implications of the Past 25 Years
for Policy Condittonality, Capacity Building
and Sustainability
Uma Lele
The World Bank

Why should we be interested in understanding the interactions of
foreign assistance with the agricultural development of developing coun
tries? First, because foreign assistance plays a major role in the expen
ditures of low-income developing countries. In Africa currently, from
30 percent to 60 percent of government expenditures in many coun
tries come from foreign aid, and the share of government expenditures
in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of African countries ranges from
25 percent to 35 percent. Even in a large country such as India, at its
peak foreign assistance constituted close to a quarter of the gross domestic
investment.
Second, development of the agricultural sector plays an important
role in the overall economic development of countries at early stages
of development, and governments need to play an important role in
developing agriculture due to the "public goods" nature of many in
vestments such as agricultural research, extension and physical in
frastructure. These investments require lumpy capital and skills for their
development. Small farmers with low incomes cannot mobilize resources
on their own on a scale needed to establish such infrastructure, especially
as the benefits derived from such investments have long gestation lags.
Besides, they are not easily captured and recovered through direct cost
recovery, hence the important role for government at early stages of
development.
I am grateful to Paul Fishstein for research assistance and to Kirn Tran for typing the paper.
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Third, the contribution of foreign assistance to government activity
consists not simply of financial transfers, but also of the transfer of ideas
in the form of policy advice, skills provided through technical assistance
which accompanies investment decisions, and institutional development
through such means as the transfer of western "models," as for in
stance the U.S.-type land-grant colleges for agricultural research and
extension. These various nonfinancial transfers can have a profound
effect on the efficiency with which financial resources are utilized by
the recipient countries and thus on the pace of growth of production
and productivity. The level, stability and content of foreign assistance
are strongly influenced by the international economic and political en
vironment. It is important to explore the important dimensions of this
environment to see its impact on the nature of foreign assistance as well
as on its effectiveness.
The process of agricultural development is, however, in large measure
determined by the resource endowments, policies, institutions and
technological possibilities in the recipient countries. The extent to which
an environment conducive to agricultural development exists depends
largely on the way policymakers in developing countries perceive the
role of the agricultural sector, and the extent to which they put in place
the means to foster development.
The African situation offers a good example of the interaction be
tween domestic and international factors. The problems of African coun
tries' agricultural sectors have been at the center of international atten
tion since the late 1970s because of the broadly shared international
view that domestic policy failures largely explain their slow pace of
development. Much "aid weariness" has developed because of the
perceived failure of foreign aid to solve the problems of agricultural
development in Africa. In the 1950s and 1960s, countries in Asia went
through similar periods of balance-of-payments crises resulting from
the failures of their agricultural exports and increased food (and in
dustrial) imports. They too were seen to be increasing their dependence
on food and financial aid from developed countries and there did not
seem to be any hope of their ever being able to reach the stage of food
self-sufficiency and sustained agricultural growth. Many of them, such
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as India, Pakistan, Indonesia and even Bangladesh, have now reached
a position of food self-sufficiency, and some (e.g., India, Pakistan and
Indonesia) have become modest exporters of food. Important insights
can be derived from the experience of Asia regarding the content of
foreign aid, and especially the way it affected domestic policies, resource
endowments and institutions, which in turn enabled Asian countries to
develop agriculture. It is interesting to consider whether parallel
possibilities exist in Africa.
There has been reluctance to indulge in such comparative analysis
on grounds that few useful lessons can be learned from Asian countries
which had far superior initial endowments in the form of trained man
power and institutional capacity. These may not be reproduceable in
the African countries. A great deal of foreign aid to Africa, on the other
hand, has already involved a relatively simplistic application of far more
advanced western technologies, institutions and changing conceptions
of development. The effects of aid from OECD countries to African
agriculture over the last quarter-century constitute the subject of a ma
jor research project under my direction. Also, in providing such aid,
frequently the wrong lessons have been learned from the Asian ex
perience and applied to the African continent. For instance, the Indian
type of complex, centralized, multisectoral planning models were trendy
in the 1960s and were applied in Nigeria's early plans by western ad
visors. Concern about increased inequalities following the Green Revolu
tion in Asia resulted in donors in the 1970s placing an excessive em
phasis in Africa on integrated agricultural development of the regions
and populations with few resources and growth possibilities in the short
run. Such investment in agricultural and rural development resulted in
a large number of failed projects leading neither to growth nor equity.
Similarly, the concerns about the growing ranks of the educated
unemployed derived from the Asian experience in the 1970s lead the
international development community to underrate the fundamental im
portance of investment in education and training in African countries
in the advice and investments they offered.
Since the technological, institutional, skilled manpower and physical
resource endowments of many Asian countries are closer to those of
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Africa in some respects than the solutions derived directly either from
the West or from these various western perceptions of the relevance
of the Asian experience to Africa, it might be fruitful to make direct
comparisons between the two continents to determine more precisely
where lessons are transferable and where they are not. For instance,
semi-aridness is a major reason for Africa's poor agricultural perfor
mance. India has two-thirds of the world's cultivable area that is classified
as semi-arid and Africa has one-third. It is instructive, therefore, to
examine where growth in agricultural production occurred in India and
why, and to examine the implications for Africa's prospects in semiarid agriculture. Similarly, small-scale irrigation and low-level
agricultural technology used extensively in Asia can benefit Africa in
place of the tractorized schemes and large-scale irrigation dams financed
by foreign aid to date. As a prototype of the Asian case, I will explore
the sources of growth in India's agriculture, the causes of that growth,
and the role that foreign aid has played in that process to derive in
sights for the development of African agriculture. To do so, I first review
the international economic environment which currently determines the
level, size and sources of foreign aid to Africa and which influenced
these levels in India. I then outline briefly the motivations of aid as they
determine the type and certainty of aid. This in turn influences the ex
tent to which recipient country policymakers feel that they can rely on
external financing as a source of government expenditures. I then ex
amine the role of agriculture in economic development. Afterwards,
by reviewing India's agricultural development experience and the role
of foreign assistance in the process, I identify the sources of India's
agricultural growth and the causes of that growth. I then examine the
similarities and differences in the domestic policy environments and
aid between the African countries and India to draw implications from
the comparative experience for future agricultural development in Africa.
The International Environment for Aid
The rapid growth in agricultural production in North America, Europe
and Japan since the mid-1970s has greatly increased the world surplus
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stocks of grain in the 1980s. This situation is radically different from
the period in the 1960s when India was the major beneficiary of con
cessional aid. Then the United States was the only major source of
surplus food and foreign aid and thus the dominant source of advice,
institutional innovations and new technological possibilities introduc
ed in the agricultural sector in India. The sources of aid to the develop
ing world have greatly diversified since then, as has the prosperity among
western nations. For instance, a large number of Western European
countries and Japan as well as Eastern Bloc countries are giving con
cessional assistance to Africa. Consequently, ideas in the form of policy
advice, investments, and institutional and technological possibilities and
skills introduced through foreign aid into African agriculture are highly
diverse, frequently creating much confusion on the African scene. This
is especially the case as the ability of African governments to distinguish
between the quality of advice and assistance is greatly limited due to
their own limited capacity in terms erf trained manpower and institutions.
While the sources and levels of food and financial aid have increased
steadily until the early 1980s, they also contain the danger of providing
a false sense of security to the recipients, reducing the urgency of deal
ing with domestic policies which often inhibit the development of
agriculture. Concessional aid levels to Africa have declined from 1984
levels as a result of concern about aid effectiveness and also the reces
sionary trends in OECD countries. Willingness of the African govern
ments to adjust their domestic policies has in turn been influenced by
their concern about the decline in aid level and also by the need for
increased national self-reliance. The differing views of the diverse donors
adds to the confusion on policy adjustments in Africa.
While the broad general directions of policy reforms are clear enough,
there is much disagreement as to the speed with which such reforms
can be implemented, the size of benefits that will ensue from the reforms
and the speed with which the benefits will accrue. The large agricultural
surpluses of the OECD countries have changed the international markets
and prices by causing a downward pressure on world agricultural prices;
this has been reinforced by the countries in Asia becoming exporters,
a situation which did not exist in the 1960s. Developing countries of
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Africa on the one hand face lower real prices for their agricultural ex
ports due to these surpluses of commodities such as sugar, edible oil,
etc., and on the other hand suffer from the competition of low-cost im
ported cereals. Meanwhile, their own domestic food production con
stitutes the major source of employment and income for a great ma
jority of their populations, with over 60 percent of their cultivated area
under cereal production. Cheap food imports can increase the real in
comes of urban populations, but by depressing internal terms of trade
they can reduce the incomes of agricultural producers in developing
countries, especially if there is no growth in the productivity of their
agriculture to compensate for these price declines. If African countries,
in addition, face large deficits in their balance of payments resulting
from a combination of their own failed import-substituting industrializa
tion policies of the 1970s and also the recessionary world market forces
referred to above which have reduced the prices of their exports, this
explains the need for macroeconomic reform in their countries to ad
just to the changing world market. An increase in the domestic
agricultural factor productivity which will reduce the cost of African
production and make it more competitive with cheap agricultural im
ports or exports of competitors is thus the most important way to avert
further decline in the real incomes of African countries.

Motivations of Aid
Aid is prompted by many reasons. Recipients have preferred to think
of aid much in the way that Senator Fulbright considered it, namely,
as a form of progressive international taxation in which a small share
of the income of high-income countries is mobilized and transferred
to their low-income counterparts for the latter's development. Since
developing countries are dependent on primary commodity exports, the
prices of which fluctuate more than those of manufactured goods and
services exported by developed countries, these countries have argued
for aid so as to stabilize their export income. The concept of aid as
a form of income transfer, however, has not had a broad appeal in the
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United States, although a large majority tends to be in favour of emergen
cy aid on humanitarian grounds. Public opinion surveys show, for in
stance, that while 79 percent of those interviewed in the U.S. approv
ed of emergency aid only 49 percent supported long-term development
assistance.
Aid, is course, also given by developed countries to meet their
strategic, military or foreign policy concerns. In the case of aid pro
grams of the United States, this has often resulted in assistance being
highly concentrated on a few countries of the world, regardless of their
developmental needs. U.S. aid levels to specific countries have also
been quite unstable, depending on changes in those foreign policy or
strategic considerations. Aid given to create long-term markets for the
goods and services produced in the developed countries has more recently
simply resulted in the disposal of surpluses existing in the OECD coun
tries in the form of commodities, trained manpower or underutilized
industrial capacity. Such desire for surplus disposal frequently results in
tying of financial aid to the supply of equipment or trained manpower
of the donor country, which may not be the most desirable for the
development of recipient countries.
Motivations for aid may thus greatly affect the size, as well as the
form and stability, of aid. Aid-giving countries may also refuse to share
the secrets of their success so as to avoid future competition from reci
pients. Aid may thus increase dependence of recipients in the short run
without the possibility of its leading to self-reliance in the long run.
This is, of course, a greater problem with bilateral than multilateral
aid such as that of the World Bank, which is not tied to a particular
source and is not related to strategic and military interests of individual
countries.
Interaction of Foreign Aid with Domestic Policies
We now move on to consider the interaction of the level, form and
stability of aid with the motivations for aid and its effects on the domestic
policies of recipient countries by taking the example of India. Nearly
60 percent of the $10 billion of U.S. aid received by India between 1949
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and 1982 was given in the form of food aid, another 20 percent in the
form of nonproject aid, and only 17 percent in the form of project loans.
Bilateral assistance by the U.S. to India was relatively low until about
1958, accelerated sharply to a peak in about 1968, and then declined
sharply, especially from about 1972, to the point of becoming insignifi
cant. Given its large size (750 million population), aid levels to India,
on a per capita basis, have been very low at their peak in 1965-66
being $2.6 compared to $20 to $50 per capita in many African coun
tries currently. Only about 12 percent of these expenditures was on
agricultural projects, most of a small-scale nature. 1 This situation is
in contrast to that of many African countries in several ways. First,
in Africa not only is the overall level of aid much higher, but the
dependence on food aid is very small in comparison with India's. Food
aid constitutes only about 10 percent of total aid to Africa, compared
to over 50 percent of U.S. assistance to India. Much of the aid is in
the form of financial aid and also in the form of projects. In contrast,
much of the U.S. assistance to India was in the form of commodity
or program aid and only a small amount in project aid. Project aid in
Africa has tended to tax the limited planning and implementation capacity
of the countries, as the resources devoted to developing such capacity
further have been relatively limited, unlike in India. Also, quite a signifi
cant amount of technical assistance has been provided to help in the
implementation of projects. It is estimated that close to $4 billion were
committed by OECD countries in the form of technical assistance to
Africa during the 1970s.
Relatively little of this technical assistance has been allocated to im
proving domestic policy, planning and implementation capacity. Indeed,
much of the "learning by doing" has involved the technical assistance
staff and, due to their short tenures, there has been much loss of learn
ing by doing. This is an especially serious problem given that African
countries start from a poorer initial base of trained manpower and in
stitutional development that did India. In India, only about 1,400 U.S.
agricultural advisors are estimated to have resided on a long-term basis
from 1952 to 1973, and never more than 150 advisors at any given point
in time. Only about 3,200 Indians were trained in agricultural and natural
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resource issues during this period. These numbers do not seem large
in relation to India's size and needs. Yet there is a general belief that
the U.S. made an important contribution to India's agricultural
development.
I argue in this paper that it is the quality and the form of assistance
which was the basis of this contribution and it is the nature of the in
teraction of aid with domestic agricultural and overall policy which ex
plains the success. The contributions appear to be in the form of:
(1) developing of indigenous human and institutional capacity for
agricultural research, policy, planning and evaluation, and (2) input into
the formation and implementation of an overall agricultural policy which
would be conducive to growth. We will stress that the initiative for im
proved policy and planning ultimately came from India. The successive
droughts, increased dependence on foreign aid and external interference
in domestic policy affairs from about 1958, when foreign aid accelerated,
until about 1965 when it reached a crescendo for India to reform its
agricultural policies and to put in place a package of internally consis
tent reforms which would increase production led to this initiative. Good
luck also played a part. Apart from India's obviously better institutional
and trained manpower base, the existence of technologies it could im
port as well as the institutional models for technology generation it could
borrow and install at home made a difference to its prospects. Finally
and of considerable importance, India had been experimenting with dif
ferent policies since the early 1950s and there was much accumulated
learning through this process; when the crisis arose in the mid-1960s,
India was able to utilize this valuable learning experience. We will show
that these preconditions are not enjoyed by Africa to the same extent.
Until about 1963, India pursued a growth strategy which stressed an
import-substituting industrialization policy in which agriculture had a
relatively small role. During the first three plan periods the proportion
of investments going to the agricultural sector ranged between 6 per
cent to 10 percent. India has been broadly criticized for keeping its
agricultural prices low prior to 1967. 2 Our analysis indicates that In
dian prices were well above world market prices for wheat between
1957 to 1972, however, even when measured in real effective exchange

56 Lele

rates (see Figure 3). Only in the case of rice were prices below interna
tional prices prior to 1967.
Programs for the development of agriculture, however, tended to focus
on community development and extension programs aimed at convinc
ing farmers to adopt modern technology. But the most important factor
to be emphasized is that the physical response of production to fertilizers
was relatively low for the traditional varieties of wheat and rice (Desai
had estimated fertilizer response coefficients of 12kg per 1kg of nutrient
for irrigated wheat under local conditions, the equivalent coefficients
being lOkgs for rice). It is noteworthy that despite the impressive an
nual growth rate of nutrient use of 19.8 percent annually, the average
annual rate of growth for foodgrain output was about 3 percent per year
during this period and there were substantial year-to-year fluctuations
in overall production that tended to be influenced largely by weather.
Dependence on imports had increased to meet domestic food re
quirements. Figure 1 shows the domestic availability of food grains in
cluding the rising imports in the mid-1960s. Figures 2 and 3 show the
relationship of domestic to international prices of rice and wheat in In
dia and illustrate the less favorable treatment of rice in terms of inter
national prices as well as relative to wheat. Figure 4 shows the growth
of fertilizer use in India. While India's dependence on financial assistance
had increased by 1958 as a result of a foreign exchange gap created
by an ambitious second plan and aggravated by the persistent need for
commercial food imports, by 1966 net food imports had grown to over
10 million tons.
The role of price policy reform vis-a-vis other agricultural policies
is worth considering in the context of India's agricultural growth since
1967. President Johnson believed that India was not serious about an
agricultural policy reform. Further support for India's development by
the U.S. and the World Bank, which had begun to emerge as a major
donor, was contingent on India's devaluating its currency as well as
a package of policies for the agricultural sector including increased pro
ducer prices for rice and wheat, increased imports of fertilizers and pro
motion of their role for the private sector and concentration among the
progressive farmers in high potential areas, and support of prices for
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the agricultural sector by a newly established food corporation of India
becoming the buyer and seller of last resort. Many of these policies
are similar to those now being advocated in African countries. It has
generally been the U.S. belief that the imposition of these conditions
on India in the mid-1960s as a prerequisite for receiving financial
assistance from the U.S. and the World Bank, codified in the "Treaty
of Rome" between the Indian minister of agriculture and the U.S.
secretary of agriculture, had a profound impact on India's food situation.
Indeed, frequently the 1965 episode in India is cited in the context
of the current discussion on policy reform in Africa, suggesting that
achievement of the same policy reform in Africa, if necessary through
the same type of conditionality, might solve Africa's problems.
There are, however, several important differences between the In
dian and African cases which are worth highlighting. 3 First, much of
the productivity growth in India occurred under irrigated conditions.
In contrast, only 6 percent of the area under cultivation in Africa is
irrigated. Not only was India's initial base of irrigated agriculture larger
(18 percent of the area under cultivation being irrigated), but the new
high-yielding technologies induced further investment in irrigation. Sec
ond, the high-yielding rice and wheat varieties used in India were the
result of major technological breakthroughs which had occurred in the
international agricultural research institutes. In the case of wheat, this
resulted in a Nobel Peace prize for its discoverer. Estimated response
coefficients of high-yielding wheat under irrigated conditions are 20kgs
per kg of nutrient, or 66 percent larger than under traditional varieties
and of rice 15kgs, or 50 percent higher than traditional varieties.
Even then, the political decision to concentrate the use of fertilizer
in limited areas of high potential was a difficult decision for the Indian
government. I have documented elsewhere that there was internal op
position to this approach from almost every important Indian lobby,
including the intellectuals, the communists, the state governments, who
would not gain from such concentration, the planning commission,
because it would require increased foreign exchange, etc. Nevertheless,
subsequent fertilizer use in India was highly concentrated in high potential
areas.
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Most important, with the assistance of the Rockefeller and Ford Foun
dations and the U.S. government, India had been attempting to build
up its agricultural research system starting as early as the late 1940s.
The food crisis, however, provided the basis for pushing through dif
ficult policy decisions with regard to the research system's reorganiza
tion that had been stalled for nearly 20 years due to the internal resistance
to reform. Therefore with the advent of the food crisis, India was able
to put into operation an effective research system. This made the subse
quent adjustments to continue to maintain its productivity gains possi
ble. Such an adaptive research capability is particularly important in
the case of crops which encounter highly diverse growing conditions
and which therefore require a high degree of local adaptation. This was
the case with regard to rice. The Indian research system was ultimately
able to issue 221 varieties of rice to address the many diverse adoption
problems faced in the promotion of new rice varieties.
Table 1 shows that irrigated wheat alone accounted for an astonishing
99 percent of the increase in productivity during the 1968-69 to 1981-82
period. Rice contributed another 15 percent. During the earlier 1956-57
to 1968-69 period, wheat and rice had contributed 89 and 79 percent
respectively to increased productivity. Because the contribution of other
rainfed crops to the overall growth in production such as millet, sorghum,
maize, etc., which are the dominant crops in Africa as well, was nil
or negative (meaning the area under cultivation of these crops declined
due to competition of higher productivity crops), the combined con
tribution of wheat and rice accounted for over 100 percent of aggregate
productivity growth. There was a complex input substitution with the
new technology. In the rainfed areas, the new technology increased pro
ductivity from irrigation more and the spread of minor irrigation, par
ticularly from tubewells, was very rapid. Whereas tubewells accounted
for only about 6 percent of irrigated area in 1960-61, they accounted
for about 14 percent by 1970-71 and 20 percent in the mid-1970s. In
the irrigated areas, use of fertilizer accelerated as the marginal produc
tivity of fertilizer curve shifted upwards and flattened out at a much
greater input level. But because use of fertilizer on rainfed areas grew
slowly, total fertilizer use increased at an annual rate of about 12 per
cent, slower than before. It is noteworthy that the foodgrain produc-

Table 1
Crop-Wise Contributions of Individual Effects to the Change
in Aggregate Productivity by Period
(Rupees per hectare)
1956/57 to 1968/69
Pure
yield
effect

Pure
location
effect

Location
interaction
effect

Pure
cropping
pattern
effect

Cropping
pattern
interaction
effect

Sum of
effects

Bajra
Barley
Cotton
Groundnuts
Jowar
Maize
Pulses
Ragi
Rice
Sugarcane
Small millets
Wheat

3.53
1.54
2.81
-1.36
-0.16
1.17
2.11
0.03
25.45
0.77
-0.09
20.05

-0.23
-0.06
0.05
0.16
0.18
0.09
1.40
-0.01
0.88
0.37
-0.01
1.23

-0.03
0.20
-0.07
0.18
0.01
0.19
-.068
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.02
1.42

-2.09
-10.03
-33.44
14.48
-4.15
19.39
-15.87
-3.68
16.24
-1.03
-6.49
95.12

0.14
-0.97
0.55
-2.57
-0.17
2.29
0.20
0.10
7.71
0.15
0.09
38.00

1.37
-9.32
-30.10
10.89
-4.29
23.14
-12.83
-3.54
50.09
0.25
-6.48
155.82

(0.78)
(-5.33)
(-17.20)
(6.22)
(-2.45)
(13.22)
(-7.33)
(-2.02)
(28.62)
(0.14)
(-3.70)
(89.05)

Total

55.86
(31.92)

4.04
(2.31)

1.12
(0.64)

68.45
(39.12)

45.52
(26.01)

174.99
(100.00)

(100.00)

Crop

>
I

O
a

ON

1968/69 to 1981/82

ON
K>

Pure
yield
effect

Pure
location
effect

Location
interaction
effect

Pure
cropping
pattern
effect

Cropping
pattern
interaction
effect

Sum of
effects

Bajra
Barley
Cotton
Groundnuts
Jowar
Maize
Pulses
Ragi
Rice
Sugarcane
Small millets
Wheat

0.72
1.10
3.77
2.66
6.69
0.07
-1.15
2.05
20.41
0.56
0.30
32.07

-0.24
0.21
1.08
-0.06
-0.31
0.20
-1.88
-0.09
3.51
0.17
-0.22
2.93

-0.45
-0.14
0.20
0.83
-0.11
0.20
0.69
-0.03
1.50
-0.01
0.08
0.40

-6.65
-15.37
-4.64
-9.50
-7.46
-9.31
6.23
-1.61
10.88
12.33
-10.25
206.01

-0.17
-2.45
-2.65
-0.39
-1.66
0.09
0.44
-0.20
3.01
0.51
-0.16
20.11

-6.80
-16.66
-2.23
-6.46
-2.86
-8.74
4.33
0.11
39.30
13.57
-10.25
261.51

(-2.57)
(-6.29)
(-0.84)
(-2.44)
(-1.08)
(-3.30)
(1.64)
(0.04)
(14.84)
(5.12)
(-3.87)
(98.75)

Total

69.24
(26.15)

5.28
(1.99)

3.15
(1.19)

170.65
(64.44)

16.49
(6.23)

264.83
(100.00)

(100.00)

Crop

SOURCE: Bindlish (forthcoming).
( ) Indicates percent of the sum of the effects for the period.
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tion growth rate accelerated to 3.5 percent annually during 1965-66 to
1976-77, despite the deceleration in fertilizer growth rate by over 40
percent to 12 percent annually. This would suggest an improved effi
ciency of fertilizer use brought about by two related factors: technical
change in the form of the new grain varieties with higher fertilizer
response coefficients and an acceleration in the rate of growth of ir
rigation (table 2) induced by the enhanced profitability of the new
varieties.
Table 2
Growth Rates for Foodgrain Production, Fertilizer Use
and Irrigated Area
Foodgrains

Fertilizer

Irrigated area

Annual

3-yr. avg.

Annual

Gross

Net

3.03
3.83
2.65
2.89

2.97
3.54
2.32
2.86

19.84
11.78
9.06
16.06

2.14
3.11
2.64
2.74

1.95
2.71
1.88
2.22

Period

1951/52
1965/66
1977/78
1951/52

-

64/65
76/77
84/85
84/85

SOURCES: "Area and Production of Principal Crops in India," Government of India; "Fer
tilizer Statistics," The Fertilizer Association of India.
NOTES: Information on foodgrain production was available only through 1983-84. Information
on irrigated area was availably only through 1981-82. "Annual" refers to a simple yearly series,
while "3-yr. avg." refers to a three-year moving average series. Irrigated area rates use an an
nual series.

Finally, since the U.S. was the only supplier of food and since its
reserves were declining rapidly, India realized that, should a deficit arise,
increased reliance on the U.S. for food imports was likely to be un
wise, as it would result in increased world food prices given India's
large food import requirements. It was also injurious to national pride,
as it would compromise India's pursuit of an independent foreign policy
because of the dependence on scarce U.S. stocks. Thus Indian
policymakers were able to overcome a number of formidable domestic
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obstacles to reform, although the individuals involved in the reform paid
a substantial cost. (Mr. Subramaniam, the minister of agriculture, for
instance, lost the election in 1967 because of a perception that he had
become too pro-American.)
The current discussion of macroeconomic and sectoral policy condi
tionally tied to financial aid of donors in Africa, as well as the increas
ed food imports, are reminiscent of India's situation for those involved
in such assistance earlier. Nevertheless, many differences exist, although
many African countries have devaluated, revised their food prices and
liberalized fertilizer imports and distribution as did India. There have
been relatively few technological breakthroughs in the case of crops
grown in the semi-arid areas of either Africa or India, however. The
exception is hybrid maize, which has shown impressive growth in many
parts of Africa where similar effective services in the form of timely
fertilizer supply, extension and output marketing facilities have been
available. Some technological possibilities exist, but require effective
adaptation of varieties and practices to local conditions such as that done
by the Indian research system in the case of rice earlier. The national
research systems of most African countries, with the exception of Zim
babwe and Kenya, have not shown the capacity to organize adaptive
research programs which would lead to the production of more suitable
planting material.
Unlike in India, donors who have focused on project aid until recently
have neglected the development of national research systems; contrary
to much conventional wisdom on the subject, they have assumed that
borrowing technology from the international research systems and con
ducting on-farm adoptive research without building the national research
system which will carry out effective on-station research will address
the problem. They have therefore not invested in either the develop
ment of national research systems or in the training of nationals on the
scale necessary. Now that national research systems have been recogniz
ed to be a critical bottleneck, however, all donors, who often have con
flicting ideas as to what research to conduct and how, have begun to
focus on the systems, creating much competition and confusion in the
African countries, especially given the limited resources they can bring
to bear.
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The implications of food surplus in the world must also be considered
here in their effect on motivation to address policy problems in Africa.
Food aid is relatively easily available to African governments, whose
food import requirements are small. Therefore, they have not yet at
tached the degree of priority to the long-run development of their own
science and technology capacity and to the improvement of their
agricultural delivery systems to experience sustained growth in produc
tion and productivity. Although some are experimenting with policy
reform, attempts at policy reform are by themselves unlikely to solve
the problem. Even in encouraging policy reform, however, the donors
have not yet begun to program their assistance to create the long-run
policy planning capacity in African governments. Such emphasis on
capacity building is needed, given the fact that African countries start
with a poorer initial base.
The contrast between India and Africa shows that the nature and the
severity of external shocks can make a difference in the extent to which
policy makers in developing countries are willing to undertake reform.
In India's case, however, both good planning and good luck played a
much more important role than is generally acknowledged. India's own
trained manpower and domestic economic planning ability could be
harnessed in a period of crisis. The small number of donors helping
India placed emphasis on strengthening India's policy making, implemen
tation and technological capacity.
These comparisons reinforce the point frequently made in the case
of African agriculture, namely, that the sources of stagnation of rainfed agriculture are quite complex and will require a much longer time
horizon to overcome. They will require a much more sustained effort
than either donors or African governments are yet fully ready to
undertake.
NOTES
1. These data are assembled in Arthur A. Goldsmith, "American Foreign Assistance and
Agricultural Development in India," background paper prepared for the World Bank Develop
ment Strategy Division, 1985.
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2. See Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development. Cam
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1977; T. W. Schultz, Development and Change in Traditional
Agriculture: Focus on South Asia. East Lansing:Asian Studies Center, Michigan State Universi
ty, 1968; and Paul Streeter and Michael Lipton, eds., Crisis of Indian Planning. London: Oxford
University Press, 1968.
3. The discussion in the succeeding paragraphs draws from Uma Lele and Arthur A. Goldsmith,
Building Agricultural Research Capacity: India's Experience with the Rockefeller Foundation and
its Significance for Africa, DRD Discussion Paper #213, December 1986.

United States Agriculture
in the
Global Context
John W. Mellor
International Food Policy Research Institute

United States agriculture is in a global context. On the order of half
the farm land in the United States is used to produce for export. Without
overseas markets, the amount of adjustment American agriculture would
require to bring domestic supply and demand into balance is almost im
possible to conceive. That adjustment would involve the movement out
of agriculture of about half of the resources of American agricultural
production. If comparative advantage was at work without overseas
markets, the bulk of farmers would leave agriculture and well over half
of all the land which is now in agriculture would convert to other uses.
American farmers must think in a global context, must recognize that
their future depends on export markets and must recognize where those
export markets are. This hardly seemed a problem a decade ago, but
it is very much a problem now.
Before I proceed, I would like to state a simple message and a broad
thought. We should all be thankful for the bountiful harvests occur
ring in much of the world. We should be concerned that if we are com
placent about those harvests, they will diminish in the future. We should
be apprehensive that the extreme complexity of the task of using these
bountiful harvests to banish hunger and to bring prosperity to those who
produce them will turn us away from the policies needed to sustain and
use that abundance.
I am grateful to Leonardo Paulino and J.S. Sarma for stimulating interaction on these important
issues, David Chesser for developing much of the data, and especially to Tom Harrington for
his efforts in developing data and drafting the paper.
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The Current Situation
Today there appears to be an abundance and even a glut of food. In
sharp contrast, a little more than a decade ago the World Food Con
ference was called to recommend immediate action to deal with scarci
ty and even famine in Asia and Africa. Global cereal stocks in the
mid-1980s have been more than twice as large as in the mid-1970s.
Real world cereal prices in 1985 were 30 percent lower than in 1981,
compared to an almost twofold increase from 1972 to 1974. Real fer
tilizer prices have fallen to equal the lows of the late 1960s, after hav
ing more than quadrupled in real terms from 1971 to 1974. A lack of
natural feedstock is now much less worrying than inadequate invest
ment in fertilizer production. The focus of food shortage has switched
from Asia to Africa.
In the early 1970s, not only was food scarce, but so were the inputs
for producing it. If a low-income country had a crop failure, it was
difficult for them to command the foreign exchange to import necessary
food, food aid was greately diminished, and it was difficult to purchase
fertilizer on the open market even if the countries had the necessary
financial resources. That was an extremely difficult time for all food
deficit countries and particularly the low-income ones.
Finally, many developing countries were diverted from long-term
development efforts by overwhelming debt problems and the need for
major adjustments in foreign exchange rates and their national budgets.'
In comparing the 1980s with the 1970s, it is worth making note of
the switch in emphasis of food problems from Asia to Africa. In Asia
in the late 1960s famine was widespread and the scarcity of food was
acute. People like the Paddock brothers, in Famine 1975, were writing
in favor of triage. The Paddock brothers argued that the food situation
was so hopeless in Asia that close to a billion people should be written
off as having no hope for survival. Although that idea was foolish even
then, it is well to note how bad the situation looked at that time. Africa,
however, seemed to be a continent abundant with land and with ample
supplies of food.
The Green Revolution in Asia accelerated the rate of growth of
food production considerably in the late 1960s and the 1970s. That,
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combined with the generally more favorable food situation in the world
and growing incomes in many Asian countries which allow them to
increase food imports when in need has switched the world food prob
lem away from Asia. In Africa, however, per capita food production
has been declining rapidly for a decade or two. Per capita consumption
has also fallen. That has occurred in the midst of a miserable economic
performance in most African countries that has resulted in acute food
scarcity even in the face of the present global abundance.

Underlying Trends
Food production and consumption data for many developing coun
tries are notoriously poor. Thus in examining the data and drawing con
clusions about past trends and certainly for extrapolations into the future,
one must be cautious. For some commodities, such as cassava in Africa,
different sources show trends going in opposite directions, not just dif
ferences in magnitude. Thus we will be particularly careful with the
root crop data, and we will be careful to deal only with large aggregates,
which, one can hope, average out discrepancies in the data.
It is also worth adding that analysis of these trends is useful for get
ting an indication of the forces affecting supply and demand. Given that
these-forces tend to be stable and powerful, it gives us a basis for look
ing into the future. Despite the statistical difficulties, the policy con
clusions which follow from the analysis are significant. They, of course,
may lead inexorably to policy actions unacceptable to important interest
groups. Thus, even analysis of past trends becomes a controversial mat
ter. The facts of the global food situation are as contentious as the
extrapolations.
As we discuss these underlying trends, we will see that the dynamic
global food supply/demand balance links the interests of developed and
developing countries and has important implications for foreign
assistance, agricultural research policy, and the domestic agricultural
policy of the United States.
For the period 1961-80, developing countries' cereal production grew
at an annual rate of 2.9 percent per year; consumption grew at the
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considerably faster rate of 3.2 percent per year (table I). 2 Hence, net
annual cereal imports of the developing countries increased more than
fourfold in 20 years from about 15 million tons to 64 million tons. 3
These data exclude the People's Republic of China because the extreme
variability of production caused by major political events associated with
the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution" grossly
distorts trends that include these periods.

Table 1
Trend Annual Growth Rates of Cereal Consumption
and Production for Developing and Developed Countries
1961-80 and 1961-83
,
Country
group

1961-80
1961-83
_________________________________
Consumption Production Consumption Production

Developing

3.6

3.5

3.6

3.5

(excluding China)

(3.2)

(2.9)

(3.3)

(2.9)

Developed

2.5

3.1

2.2

2.8

SOURCE: FAO, "Production Yearbook Tape, 1984," and "Agricultural Supply Utilization Ac
counts Tapes, 1984" (Rome 1985).

Cereal imports to developing countries grew slowly in the 1960s and
then accelerated sharply after 1972, with that accelerated growth showing
no sign of decline through 1984 (table 2). 4 Developing countries in
creased their share of total world imports of cereals from a 1961-63
average of 36 percent to a 1981-83 average of 43 percent an absolute
increase of 315 percent (table 3). The developing countries represent
the only cereal market capable of rapid growth.
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Table 2
Growth Rates and Relative Shares in Cereal Trade
1961 to 1983
Country
group

Average annual growth rate*

Relative shares

1961-83

1961-72
(percent)

1972-83

1961-65

1970-74
(percent)

1981-83

Imports
Developing
Developed

6.0
4.6

3.0
4.0

8.1
3.3

36
64

35
65

43
57

Exports
Developing
Developed

3.4
5.5

2.7
3.9

6.2
4.8

19
81

15
85

15
85

*Based on trended FAO data.

Table 3
Distribution of World Cereal Imports by Country Groupings
1961-63 and 1981-83
1961-63
Country
group

1981-83

Million
metric tons

Percent

Million
metric tons

Percent

Developed countries

54.9

64

130.8

57

Developing countries

30.9

36

97.5

43

All countries

85.8

100

228.3

100

SOURCE: FAO, "Agncultural Supply Utilization Accounts Tape, 1984" (Rome 1985).

From 1961 to 1980, cereal production in the developed countries grew
3.1 percent per year. Consumption grew at a much slower pace, 2.5
percent per year, with the difference representing a rapidly growing
exportable surplus. 5 Developed country imports and exports dropped
sharply from 1981 to 1984, with a substantial recovery in 1985. 6
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The Future: Projections to 2000
Projections of past trends for food supply and demand, though an
uncertain indicator of the future, have three features that recommend
them: they smooth the effects of short-term influences such as weather;
they illuminate the effects of cumulative forces; and they show poten
tial changes in a country's position from net importer to net exporter
and vice versa, arising from given supply and demand changes. Such
projections are particularly revealing for food, for which underlying
structural forces of supply and demand only change slowly.
A standard projection from 1980 to 2000 for developing countries,
assuming that trends in output and income from the 1960s to 1980s con
tinue, shows an increase in the shortfall (or imports) of staple food crops
of 40 million tons. Actual net imports in 1984 were on the projected
trend line.7
Growth in the demand for livestock products is an important source
of growth in the demand for basic food staples. While in developing
countries waste and by-products initially sustain livestock production,
accelerated growth of livestock output quickly surpasses the inelastic
supply of such feed. Further increments to production are made large
ly on concentrate feeds, particularly cereals. The projections cited above
assume constant feeding rates in livestock production.
If, however, we project the trend growth of feed use during the base
period and further assume market relationships for livestock products
at constant relative prices, the production shortfall in developing coun
tries increases by another 40 million tons. 8 It must be emphasized that
this projection of feed use requires a return to the per capita income
growth of the 1966-80 period. The debt and structural adjustment crises
must be met and passed beyond.
Developing countries have been expanding livestock product imports
rapidly. Since livestock production is generally labor intensive, it is
logical for developing countries to displace projected imports with
domestic production. Success in such an effort would, conservatively,
add another 40 million tons to food crop imports.
These favorable circumstances in essence mean that developing coun
tries would improve their development strategy and return to the growth
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rates of the 1960s and 1970s. If they did this, developing country im
ports would grow at a rate similar to or higher than in the past two
decades.
Three caveats must be noted about such projections. First, one must
take these numbers in aggregated form and not look at individual coun
tries. That is because so many of the unpredictable events in the world
benefit some countries and not others. For example, in the 1970s growth
in most of the oil-producing countries surged ahead, it is said, at the
expense of many oil-importing developing countries; perhaps the reverse
will happen in the 1990s. Countries differ in their natural resource
bases:Argentina and Thailand have very different ratios of people to
agricultural production resources from Taiwan or Bangladesh. On all
these matters, grouping countries helps us see central tendencies at
times we do want to see the forest and not the trees.
Second, and very important, when we look at food gaps and trade
figures, we are looking at small residuals from large estimates of con
sumption and production small differences in production and consump
tion data give large differences in "trade." It is rash indeed to predict
trade volumes and their effects on global prices.
Third, we are poorly placed to judge the effects of pure science
breakthroughs in biology on agricultural production. Keep in mind that
while such breakthroughs add to demand as well as supply in develop
ing countries, they add only to supply in developed countries.

Theory
Before drawing conclusions, it is useful to briefly outline the theory
that lies behind the trends and relationships just presented, a theory that
gives credibility to such projections. I abstract grossly for brevity. 9
In developed countries, food demand is virtually satiated and hence
does not increase with income. In contrast, food output grows con
tinuously through research and various complementary institutions.
Without export growth, the benefit of technological change can only
be realized by undertaking the socially difficult task of rapidly withdraw
ing resources (land and people) from agriculture.
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In sharp contrast, in developing countries, the rising incomes of lowincome people, derived from employment growth, are converted by
remarkably high demand elasticities into effective demand for food 60
to 80 percent of incremental incomes are so spent. Thus in developing
countries, increased food supplies and increased employment are two
sides of the same coin; one cannot proceed long without the other.
Furthermore, accelerated growth of food production can set in mo
tion powerful multiplier forces on the growth of income and, especial
ly, employment in other sectors. That, coupled with growth arising
autonomously in the other sectors, results in the picture of fast growth
in basic food staples production accompanied by even faster growth
in consumption.
These relationships make reasonable the remarkable finding that from
the early 1960s to the late 1970s, the 29 developing countries with the
fastest growth rates in basic food staple production increased their im
ports of basic food staples by 360 percent in the same period. 10 This
potential for developing countries to expand demand for food faster than
even high rates of growth of food production needs to be understood
and nurtured. It offers exciting prospects for the reduction of poverty
and malnourishment.
Implications: Developed Countries
The credibility of projections for developed countries is reduced by
the large year-to-year fluctuations in food production. However, a simple
projection to the year 2000 of domestic use and production for the period
1961-80 shows an exportable surplus from developed countries more
than double the largest projection for developing country net imports. n
These estimates assume no diminution of growth rates for livestock feed
inthe Soviet Bloc from the high rates of 1961-80. Such estimates con
firm the need for a large reduction in developed country agricultural
production.
These estimates are extraordinarily fragile. If, for example, the pro
duction growth rate in developed countries were to drop to equal rate
of 1972-83 and consumption growth rates were maintained, then the
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developed countries would actually become net importers. 12 Unfortunate
ly, while prediction of developed country exports is highly uncertain,
it matters immensely to the choice of development strategy in develop
ing countries.
Since the production trends in developed countries are very much
subject to policy, it is well to keep in mind the following points.
First, developing countries as a group will prosper more if they do
not face rapidly rising food prices driven by their own demand. Con
versely, they will be harmed by intermittent dumping on international
markets and the consequent unpredictable periods of sharply depress
ed prices.
Second, demand is much more responsive to price in developing coun
tries than in developed countries, while supply is more responsive in
developed countries than developing countries. Thus, rising global food
prices foster surpluses in developed countries and reduce demand in
developing countries, primarily through effects on the poor.
Third, however, the pace at which export surpluses are generated
in developed countries now appears to be rapid enough to depress in
ternational prices severely, suggesting a need for stuctural adjustments
in developed countries despite the rapidly growing Third World market.
Fourth, given the social costs in developed countries of drastically
reduced food production and the potential to raise food demand in
developing countries through food aid-based employment growth, it is
logical to develop such programs on a much larger scale than at present.

Implications: Developing Country Exporters
There are now few developing country net exporters of cereals. Two
countries, Argentina and Thailand, with their favorable land-to-person
ratios, accounted for 68 percent of total developing country cereal ex
ports in 1979-83 and will export considerably larger amounts by 2000. 13
There are probably one or two other developing countries with similar
land resources and export potential but with unfavorable policies that
hold back their agricultural potentials. These few countries are severe
ly injured by food dumping by high-income countries.
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It is important for American farmers to recognize that while their
markets lie in developing countries, there are very few developing coun
tries that have a potential to be major exporters. They have in the past
supplied about a quarter of the increment to developing country com
mercial food imports; three-quarters has been left for the developed
countries, including the United States.
In sharp contrast to Thailand and Argentina, the bulk of the coun
tries projected to export food in the future are poor countries with highpopulation pressure. That is a quite different story.
In projections to 2000, countries with per capita incomes less than
$500, strikingly, provide 83 percent of developing country net exports
of major staple foods other than those of Thailand and Argentina. In
particular, four countries China, India, Indonesia, and Pakistanaccount for 71 percent of projected developing country net exports, ex
cluding Argentina and Thailand (table 4). 14

Table 4
Relative Shares of Projected Developing Country Net Production Surpluses
by Level of Per Capita GNP (1980), 2000
Net production surplus
2000
Projected net surplus
countries by level of (Million
per capita GNP
(Percent)
metric tons)
1980
Less than $500
(China, India,
Indonesia, Pakistan)
Greater than $500
(Argentina, Thailand)

Percentage
of total
production
2000
(Percent)

50.1

43

61

(42.9)

(37)

(58)

66.3

57

11

(56.2)

(48)

(6)

SOURCE: Data set used in preparing IFPRI Research Report 52, Food Trends in the Third World:
Past Trends and Projections to 2000. Projections based on FAO "Production" and "Agricultural
Supply Utilization Accounts" tapes according to methodology described in Appendix 1 of Research
Report.
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Exports of food clearly represent a failure in employment generation
and poverty alleviation for countries with per capita incomes less than
$500. Half or more of their populations are deficient in food intake.
The countries in the low-income group projected to become exporters
tend to be large and populous, to have a substantial percentage of their
total GNP in nonagricultural sectors, but a large percentage of total labor
force in agriculture the former typically twice the latter. 15 Their low
per capita GNPs are, in general, increasing slowly. These characteristics
suggest that they have capital-intensive investment policies causing low
growth in employment, to the detriment of their low-income people.
A change in investment strategy would foster faster and more equitable
growth, accelerate the food production growth rate and change these
countries from food exporters to food importers.
We now see an interesting question. Is the tendency of some lowincome countries with large, hungry populations to export a result of
bad policy or is it a passing structural problem? One could argue that
since the problem is concentrated in the under $500 per capita income
countries, and seems to resolve itself when income exceeds that level,
that we should just wait. But there are difficulties in getting a country
well enough organized so that the small and medium scale service and
manufacturing sectors, which are so employment intensive, can expand
rapidly. The argument would run that as the development process pro
ceeds, the infrastructure is built, the trained personnel are developed,
and the institutional structures necessary for rapid growth in employ
ment are created. The lower-income countries simply have not yet finish
ed these complex tasks, but they will.
Alternatively, one might argue that countries such as Indonesia, In
dia, Pakistan and the People's Republic of China, the principal coun
tries in this category projected to have large exports despite widespread
hunger, have simply followed wrong development policies, that they
have concentrated their capital on a few, large-scale, highly capitalintensive industries that create little employment. This leaves little capital
to spread over most of their population, meaning that activities that are
employment-intensive are starved for capital. In this argument, a change
in the policies these countries have for prices, the allocation of capital,
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and public sector investment would bring about much more rapid growth
in employment and the demand for food. Those countries would then
cease to be exporters and would move on to the import market as do
so many other developing countries with a similar economic situation.
I will return to this issue later under the question of policy for foreign
assistance and for American agriculture.

Implications: Developing Country Importers
It is notable that, virtually without exception, developing countries
with per capita incomes greater than $500 are able to generate demand
for food more rapidly than domestic production growth. Developing
country importers with per capita incomes less than $500 also manage
to increase employment and hence effective demand more rapidly than
production. Of course the least developed countries with the lowest in
comes simply have low growth rates in food production. They are able
to use foreign assistance and food aid to keep consumption somewhat
higher than would otherwise be possible.
The number one policy need for net food importing countries is an
international environment in which food supplies are reliable. If they
are to expand employment more rapidly than food production, they must
believe, first, that the shortfalls generated by these divergent trends can
be met without steadily rising prices. That means there must be a reliable
international market. Second, and perhaps even more important, they
need to be protected from radical fluctuations in domestic and interna
tional supplies. For the latter, one needs a source of international finance
such as a well-operating International Monetary Fund cereal facility.
Whether enlarged stocks are needed as well is a moot point.
In order for employment growth to increase demand for food more
rapidly than domestic supply, there must be wide participation in the
development process. This, in turn, requires a rural infrastructure that
brings most people into close contact with the improved markets and
technology necessary for the modernization of agriculture. There is also
a need for the development of employment linkages between agriculture
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and the rest of the economy so that growing agricultural incomes will
produce expenditure patterns and responses to those patterns favorable
to the growth of rural industry and employment. Agricultural growth
through cost-decreasing technological change is the basic engine for
such growth.

A Note on Foreign Assistance Policy
Foreign assistance policies that support a strategy of growth oriented
toward increasing agricultural production and employment are favorable
both to growth and to poverty alleviation in developing countries and
to increased markets for food exporters. What are the broad policy
outlines of such a strategy?
First and foremost is investment in agricultural research and its supprt
services to start the engine of growth. Agriculture is a difficult sector
to move because of the constraints on the land area. Thus the growth
of agricultural production is subject to rapidly diminishing returns and
hence increasing cost unless agricultural research is performed, as has
been so dramatically successful in the United States, effectively so as
to come up with new technologies that increase yields per acre. Those
same technologies, which are essential in land-limited Asia, also raise
labor productivity under the conditions in Africa where labor produc
tivity is a more serious problem than land productivity.
Second is assistance to growth of infrastructure to ensure breadth of
participation in growth. In a world of food surpluses, hungry people,
and inadequate rural employment, investment in infrastructure offers
immense potential for the effective use of food aid, particularly in the
low-income countries. It is puzzling that hunger and lack of labor for
building infrastructure, can coexist with huge food surpluses.
Third is increasing food security nationally and internationally. That
is needed because a strategy relying on food and employment growth
is terribly vulnerable to the effects of normal fluctuations in food
production.
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Behind all these processes is a rapid expansion of trained people a
high-employment strategy of growth is accompanied by extraordinari
ly rapid growth in demand for educated people at all levels. Foreign
assistance is most effective when helping meet that demand.

Agricultural Research Policy
.1 want to comment specifically on agricultural research policy for
developing countries in the current global food context because of the
central role of research to agricultural progress. The onset of the Green
Revolution in Asia was very much a product of American foreign
assistance, in part from the foundations, particularly the Rockefeller
Foundation and the Ford Foundation, and in part from U.S. govern
ment foreign assistance. Assistance to agricultural research develop
ment in Asia, and now in Africa, continues to be an important element
of foreign assistance.
At the same time that agricultural research forms such an important
element of foreign assistance, we find farmers in the United States who
are concerned at loss of export markets, wondering whether helping
developing countries to do agricultural research that brings about in
creased production is going to provide competition in the domestic
markets of those countries and even from exports. As we can see from
a few countries such as Argentina and Thailand, and looking into the
future, even more from some of the poorer countries, that is a legitimate
concern. I have tried to emphasize how foreign assistance may be con
structive in helping demand to increase more rapidly than the supply
of food in the low-income countries characterized by great poverty, shor
tage of food, and malnutrition.
The new environment of apparent global abundance of food brings
somewhat differing requirements for food production research.
First, there must be an even greater emphasis than in the past on reduc
ing the costs of production and hence raising incomes. In Asia, cost
reductions occur by raising yields per acre. In Africa, the problem is
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more complex. Labor productivity is the greatest limitation to produc
tion in Africa. We can already substantiate that, in general, the ap
propriate way to raise labor productivity in Africa is through yieldincreasing technology.
In Asia, since the International Rice Research Institute's pioneering
work, which generated the variety IR8, we have not seen a major in
crease in rice yield potential or reduction in the cost of producing rise.
In fact, the real cost of production has been slowly rising over the past
decade. Recent efforts have been dedicated largely to maintaining
the yields produced by IR8 and widening the benefits of such varieties
by increasing their adaptability and improving their resistance to diseases
and pests. In this context, one can truly talk about saturation of the rice
area with these high-yielding varieties. How will the growth rates of
the recent past be maintained into the next decade or so? That is a serious
problem in Asia. Our impression of food abundance will disappear within
a decade or two without another research breakthrough.
Second, with a more bountiful food supply in the world, we have
the opportunity to take more meaningful steps towards sustainable growth
in agriculture. On the one hand, we must increasingly shift higheryielding, more productive farming systems into environments whose
ecosystems can sustain such increased intensity. That should allow a
gradual increase in the proportion of population in areas more able to
sustain it, while reducing population pressures in areas that cannot sus
tain arable agriculture. We must ask ourselves what the implications
are of this to two related research questions: (1) Under what cir
cumstances and by what mechanisms can we use the increased abun
dance of food in the world to reduce population pressures more rapidly
in areas that cannot support arable agriculture? (2) Should that then push
our research resources more towards the perennial grasses and tree crops
that can be sustained in such areas?
Third, when the abundance of food increases, we must maximize the
linkages between agricultural growth and employment growth in
nonagricultural sectors. That too requires research. Increasingly, lack
of effective demand for food is proving to be a constraint for develop
ing countries with per capita incomes less than $500, in spite of
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progress in agricultural production. We have done a good job of
documenting the existence of linkages between agricultural growth and
employment in other sectors, but we have not gone far in producing
the policy prescriptions for maximizing the size of those linkages.
Fourth, where food is more abundant, we can turn more vigorously
to increasing employment by developing smallholder livestock produc
tion. Here we face elastic demand for the product and hence a substan
tial increase in demand from a small decline in prices. There are,
however, clear technical problems, not only in production but also
in marketing. Because of the inelasticity of waste and by-product feed
supplies, research must have a twofold emphasis on increasing the
productivity of grasslands and improving our knowledge about the pro
ductive use of concentrate feeds. Any enhancement of livestock pro
duction will also help to solve the difficult problem of inferior grains,
such as millets and sorghums, and even maize. They are well-suited
to large areas and there are good possibilities for increasing their yields.
Yet the demand for them is highly inelastic except as livestock feed.
Fifth, with an increasing abundance of food, we need to focus our
attention more on the problems of the poorest countries and the poorest
people within those countries. However, these two sets of problems
call for different treatment.
There undoubtedly needs to be an emphasis on the better areas within
the poorest countries in order to increase the returns to investment in
agriculture and to generate the funds for tackling the much more dif
ficult problems of the more backward areas.
We must differentiate clearly between short-term needs to mitigate
the problems of the poorest people in the poorest regions, and longerterm adjustments that can be made as population densities in those areas
are gradually reduced through more intensive and sustainable develop
ment elsewhere.

Conclusion
Two things seem clear from the foregoing analysis, the first somewhat
more than the second. The future of American agriculture lies with the
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development of developing countries. They must raise their incomes,
not just generally but among the lower-income half of their population
specifically, so that those people have the purchasing power to increase
their expenditures on food and to improve their diets. Thus it is in the
interest of American agriculture to see development move quickly in
developing countries. Because those countries are largely agricultural,
that can only happen by developing their agriculture. Because they have
either a shortage of land or extremely low labor productivity, incomes
in agriculture can only be increased through research-based technological
advance. Thus we find the anomalous situation that it is good for
American agriculture to vigorously support agricultural research in
developing countries so that they can increase the productivity of their
agriculture. That proves not to be an anomaly because, as incomes in
those countries rise, people spend a high percentage of their increased
income on food. That is in sharp contrast to the developed countries
where rising incomes of even quite low-income people essentially do
not increase demand for food.
The second conclusion is that, at their rate of growth of food pro
duction over the last two decades, the developed countries will pro
duce far more than is necessary to meet the import needs of developing
countries. Thus there will undoubtedly have to be structural adjustment
in the agricultures of the developed countries. This is not just the United
States and Canada, but also Western Europe. That structural adjust
ment need not necessarily come from reduced prices, but our experience
is that without lower prices the fiscal cost to governments is far more
than they are willing to bear for long, although one cannot help but
note that the willingness to bear high fiscal costs to support agriculture
seems to be quite great. In both Western Europe and the United States,
we are shouldering subsidies to agriculture that are multiples of what
was thought the largest possible a decade or so ago.
If we put the first point and the second point together, we have a caveat:
that if we expect developing countries to emphasize both increasing their
demand for food and increasing production of food in their countries,
we are asking them to throw themselves open to the vagaries of weather
to a much larger extent than with alternative strategies. If they are to
do that, they will want to believe and will want to know that food security
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is assured to them. That can be done through the financing facilities
of the International Monetary Fund so that poor people in poor coun
tries can bid food away from livestock during periods of scarcity. It
also means that the developed countries, while making adjustments to
their agricultures, must be careful not to go too far and bring back the
food scarcities of the 1970s.
Let us hope that the present abundance of food is not an illusion or
a quickly passing aberration. Let us recognize abundance for the bless
ing it is. Let us respond by raising incomes in developing countries with
new, cost-effective food production technology; by using food surpluses
to back labor-intensive investment in the infrastructure that so broadens
participation in growth; by providing food security measures that reduce
the risks governments face; by caring about poverty and acting to reduce
it; and most important, by learning now how to bring the lower-income
countries to the stage of development where effective demand for food
outruns effective agricultural development policies.
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surplus of production of 400 million metric tons (1961-80) production trend to a low net deficit
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of 26 and 30 million metric tons respectively, in 2000, or 50 percent of the total projected net surplus.
14. From data set on individual countries used in Paulina, Food in the Third World. Assumptions
of projections are the same as described in footnote 7.
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Foreign Assistance
and
American Agriculture
C. Peter Timmer
Harvard University

A major policy confrontation is brewing over United States technical
assistance to agricultural development efforts in developing countries.
The longer U.S. farming remains in a financial depression due to com
petitive pressures on its agricultural exports, the more vehement is the
criticism that U.S. bilateral and multilateral aid to developing coun
tries, especially to their agricultural sectors, is stabbing American farmers
inthe back. Directors of international agricultural programs in the na
tion's land grant universities feel this heat most directly, as their budgets
are subject to review by state legislatures. Most of the faculty involved
in these programs also have speaking and extension responsibilities that
put them in day-to-day contact with farmers. United States Department
of Agriculture and USAID officials are grilled on this topic during their
testimony to Congress.
The response to these pressures has been a careful and documented
appeal to the empirical record based on a growing volume of academic
analysis of the relationship between agricultural growth in developing
countries and trends in agricultural imports, especially from the United
States. There now seems to be a rough consensus in the agricultural
development profession that a positive connection exists between these
two dimensions of the development process. The best summary of this
view is from Earl Kellogg, an agricultural economist who serves as
associate director of the International Agriculture Program for the
University of Dlinois, in a state that feels very keenly the competitive
pressures on exports:
Developing countries continue to be the best potential growth
markets for U.S. agricultural exports. To realize this poten87
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tial, they must achieve economic growth that results in in
creased per capita incomes and foreign exchange availabili
ty. Because of the size and economic importance of the
agricultural sector in developing countries, it must contribute
to this economic growth. In addition, developing countries
must be able to export products in which they have a com
parative advantage. To accomplish this growth in income and
exports will require that developing countries obtain capital
and technical assistance for agriculture and other economic
sectors. If growth and development are achieved, develop
ing countries can continue to be important customers for U.S.
agricultural exports.
For a number of reasons, then, improving agricultural and
food production in developing countries is important to U.S.
interests. These efforts benefit people living in poverty, im
prove the chances for world peace and stability and also con
tribute to the long-term prosperity of American agriculture. l
Most of us in the economic development profession hope that this
view that development assistance benefits both recipient and donor is
true. The historical record is reassuring. A study of the 1961 to 1976
period by Bachman and Paulino for the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) noted a positive relationship between
agricultural production and staple food imports.
The data suggest that staple food exporters have little cause
to worry about the rapid growth of food production in the
developing countries. Staple food imports in the rapid-growth
countries increased much faster than exports, and, conse
quently, net imports continued to grow. Although the in
creases in food production in the study countries are im
pressive, it is evident that in most of these countries food
production growth rates need to be maintained or further
augmented to meet the increasing demand for staple foods.
The expansion of both staple food exports and imports
reflects on one hand the increased production capacity in par
ticular crops in these countries and, on the other, the rapid
ly increasing demand generated by population growth and
rising income levels. Income-induced increases in demand
appear to arise from the growing demands for a greater varie
ty of foods as consumption patterns change. Data from a
number of rapid-growth countries indicate that part of the
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increased demand for staple foods arose from the expanding
use of staple foods for conversion into livestock and poultry
products. 2
Kellogg cites analysis carried out at USDA that also supports this
hypothesis. 3 Lee and Shane present Malaysia as an example of a coun
try that is becoming a consistent and growing importer of U.S.
agricultural commodities, especially feedstuffs, while rapidly developing
both domestic and export-oriented agriculture. 4 A masters thesis at the
University of Illinois conducted statistical analysis of 77 countries and
found that in "no estimated equation were results obtained that show
ed a negative coefficient significantly different from zero for the cor
relation between per capita agricultural production in developing coun
tries and their per capita imports of agricultural products." 5 Case study
analysis of Brazil and South Korea as rapidly-growing countries and
of Sierra Leone as a slowly-growing country further substantiated these
statistical results. 6
Thomas Morrison of the IMF Research Department has investigated
the long-term and short-term factors affecting cereal imports in 1979/80.
On the basis of a regression model for 48 countries which incorporated
such long-run factors as GNP per capita, population density on arable
land, average annual cereals production per capita (for the years
1977-79), and share of population living in urban areas, as well as shortrun factors such as cereal production in 1979 as a percentage of the
average, food aid (cereals) per capita, and gross international reserves
available at the end of January 1979, relative to the average for the
1977-78 period, Morrison concluded as follows:
Of the long-term determinants, level of economic develop
ment is the most significant in explaining cereal imports. The
coefficient ... is positive and significant at the 99 percent
confidence level. This result is consistent with the hypothesis
that level of economic development, through its relation to
consumption demand . . . positively influences per capita
cereal imports. The urbanization variable . . . without the
GNP variable, has the expected positive coefficient, but the
coefficient is not significant.
Of the variables indicating domestic production capacity,
only population density is significant. The coefficient is
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positive and significant at the 95 percent confidence
level. . . . This variable, indicating population pressure on
arable land, is the most reliable variable representing total
domestic food production capacity.
Cereal production per capita [average] has the expected
negative coefficient, but is not significant. One reason why
the coefficient is not significant is probably . . . that in many
countries non-cereal crops represent significant shares of total
food production.
. . . The regression equations explained between 41 and
82 percent of the variation in per capita cereal imports across
countries. Since government policies can have a significant
influence on the level of cereal imports regardless of coun
try characteristics and circumstances, one cannot expect such
regression equations to have greater explanatory power. The
fact that the equations have as much explanatory power as
they do probably reflects the strong influence the country
characteristics and circumstances have on government policies
toward cereal imports.
. . . The empirical results yield certain implications for
the future of cereal imports by developing countries. It ap
pears that the rapid growth of cereal imports by developing
countries during the 1970s, particularly by the middle-income
countries, will continue to the extent that these countries ex
perience economic growth and pass into higher stages of
economic development. Although population growth in the
developing countries has declined from its peak of about 2.4
percent in the mid-1960s to about 2.2 percent currently, in
creasing population pressure on arable land will continue to
be a significant factor affecting cereal imports in the
foreseeable future. While food aid as a share of the cereal
imports of developing countries has declined considerably
over the 1970s, it will continue perhaps in a more limited
way to provide cereals to those who could otherwise not af
ford them. Thus, the same factors that caused the rapid growth
of cereal imports by the developing countries during the 1970s
will continue to exert their influence in the 1980s. 7
This line of argument is reasonable and comforting, but it is now
demonstrably wrong for the 1980s. Why? The world debt crisis, the
overvalued U.S. dollar, and U.S. farm policy are usually cited as reasons
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why exports of U.S. agricultural products to the developing countries
have not grown since 1980. Kellogg, for example, drawing on the work
at ERS by Longmire and Mory on exchange rate problems and by Shane
and Stallings on the debt crisis, offers the following summary and
observations:
Although agricultural exports to developing countries have
increased in the past several years, total U.S. agricultural
exports have recently decreased from $43.8 billion in 1981
to $38.0 billion in 1984. There are three major reasons why
this has happened.
(1) The exchange rate of foreign currencies for U.S. dollars
has increased. For example, it now takes 32 percent more
German marks to buy one U.S. dollar's worth of U.S. goods
than in 1981. A recent USDA study [Longmire and Mory]
concluded that the stronger dollar cost the United States about
$6 billion in lost farm exports over the two-year period
1981-83.
(2) Some U.S. domestic agricultural policies tend to result
in U.S. agricultural commodities being priced above world
prices. This is obviously not good policy if one wants to en
courage agricultural exports in a competitive world economy.
(3) Total world agricultural trade has decreased since 1980
because of reduced economic growth in many countries and
increased indebtedness of many developing countries. Shane
and Stallings have estimated that the debt problem alone has
lead to a loss in potential export sales to developing coun
tries of up to 20 percent.
None of these major reasons for declining U.S. agricultural
exports has to do with increasing agricultural production in
developing countries which is one of the objectives of U.S.
universities and AID collaboration. From 1981 to 1984,
developing country per capita agricultural production has
essentially remained constant. Therefore, in the aggregate,
increases in agricultural production within developing coun
tries has not caused the decline in U.S. agricultural exports
since 1981. 8
This paper argues that all of these factors the overvalued dollar, U.S.
agricultural policy, and the mounting debt in developing countriesare connected and in turn are related to changing agricultural produc-
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tion in developing countries. Although a focus on any specific factor
results in a positive relationship between U.S. assistance for agricultural
development and subsequent value of U.S. farm exports, the picture
is not so positive when all the factors are considered together. In other
worlds, a global general equilibrium perspective has different conclu
sions from those of a partial equilibrium one and has important implica
tions for the role and impact of U.S. foreign assistance. The ultimate
conclusions in this paper remain positive, but they contain potentially
unhappy messages for American agriculture and the need for it to ad
just to new competitive pressures in world markets.
Explaining Import Demand for Grain
Why do countries import grain? To ask the question in such a bald
way raises several possibilities other than trade patterns determined by
short-run costs as reflected in the comparative advantage of trading part
ners. Recent emphasis on the food price dilemma faced by many develop
ing countries suggests that grain imports might equally be treated as
a policy instrument of governments attempting to reach an implicit or
explicit set of objectives for their food sectors. These objectives can
range from maintaining a price level (frequently "low") for a prefer
red foodgrain, assuring price stability, providing "control" over
foodgrain markets through a government food agency, provisioning a
livestock-feeding industry that produces meat for urban consumers, or
even gaining the benefits of free trade. 9
If the volume of grain imports is determined simultaneously with other
important government policy actions, models designed to predict im
port levels must come to grips with the basic dynamics of each coun
try's political economy. In those countries where foodgrain prices are
an important ingredient in those dynamics, as they are in most coun
tries of the world, a complex relationship exists among microeconomic
demand patterns, macroeconomic policies, including basic foodgrain
prices, and conditions in the world market for food and feedgrains. It
is as wrong to think that grain imports are determined by relative costs
and comparative advantage as it is that they are determined solely by
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"political decisions." Each factor influences the other, primarily through
macroeconomic and budgetary forces. Hence, it is necessary to model
international grain trading activities in a macro food policy framework.
Figure 1 shows the first of four different levels of detail in specify
ing such a model. Few would quarrel with the basic relationship specified
in Model 1, which says simply that a country's import level is func
tionally related, through some "black box" of causal mechanisms, to
its rate of economic growth. What is in the black box is, of course,
crucial. The figure shows that the primary exogenous factor influenc
ing the contents of the black box is a country's development strategy,
especially whether an import-substitution or export-promotion strategy
is being followed. Much evidence points to a significant influence of
this strategic choice on the rate of economic growth itself, not just on
its import intensity. This reverse connection between development
strategy and economic growth will be incorporated in Model 4 where
feedback mechanisms are considered. Obviously, other factors such as
a country's size, its natural resource endowment, and so on also in
fluence the relationship shown in Model 1.
Figure 1
Relationship Between Economic Growth and Imports

MODEL 1
Expected
Statistical
Relationship

Econonic Growth

— Development Strategy

(positive)

Inport Denand
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Although Model 1 says nothing at all about demand for agricultural
imports from the United States, its trade balance is strongly influenced
by the connections in Model 1. In fact, one of the arguments here is
that, from the point of view of promoting U.S. exports, far more is
at stake in the overall growth process reflected in Model 1 than in
agricultural imports per se.
Agricultural imports are the focus of Models 2 and 3. Figure 2 presents
a rough summary of the structural relationships posited implicitly or
explicitly in the work cited by Kellogg and summarized in a recent report
from the Curry Foundation, authored by Paarlberg. 10 The chain of causa
tion is still fairly simple. Agricultural development, including rising
staple food production per capita, positively influences the overall
economic growth process through another black box mechanism. This
growth translates into import demand through the same factors as in
Model 1. Overall import demand leads to growing demand for
agricultural imports, again through a set of complex causal relation
ships contained in a black box. In Model 2 the black box connecting
agricultural development with overall economic growth is mediated by
a country's food policy. 11 The mechanisms that connect overall level
of imports with agricultural imports includes a system of supply and
demand relationships for individual commodities as well as the influences
of income distribution, urbanization, other demographic factors, and
changing tastes. As stressed above, these mechanisms also include the
set of food policy objectives, instruments, and interventions.
The expected sign of the statistical relationship between factors con
nected by black boxes is also shown in figure 2. Normally, each of the
three relationships should be positive. Agricultural development leads
to economic growth; economic growth leads to larger import demand;
and larger overall import demand also leads to larger agricultural im
ports. The last relationship is the least certain in terms of economic
logic and rests primarily oiLempirical evidence. Since the relationship
between rapid income growth and food consumption provides a key
piece of that evidence, a review of this nexus is a major part of this
paper. Whatever the historical record, however, it is easy to postulate
mechanisms that would lead to reduced agricultural imports even in the
face of economic growth and rising nonagricultural imports.
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Model 2 provides a rough vehicle for understanding the positive rela
tionship that exists in the historical record between a country's
agricultural development and its resulting agricultural imports. Each
of the black boxes, however, contains important economic and political
relationships which are subject to change compared with the historical
record. In addition, Model 2 is incomplete in terms of explaining the
"stabbed in the back" phenomenon because the role of technical
assistance is not yet connected to agricultural development in develop
ing countries, nor are agricultural imports into a particular country
translated into the value of U.S. agricultural exports.
Figure 2
Relationship Between Agricultural Development
and Agricultural Imports
Expected
Statistical
Relationship

(positive)

HODEL 2
Agricultural Development

—— Food Policy

Economic Growth

(positive)

j^^^^l —— Development Strategy

Import Demand

(positive)

^^^^| —— Structure of demand and
supply, income distribution,
food policy
Agricultural Imports
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Model 3 attempts to specify these additional relationships. Great con
troversy exists over the efficacy of technical assistance in helping lowincome countries develop their agricultural sectors. Some would argue
that the record is mostly negative; inappropriate technologies and com
modities are stressed at the expense of village-level knowledge and foods
of the poor. 12 At the other end of the spectrum is a "science solves
all food problems" approach which sees a strong positive link between
foreign assistance and agricultural development. 13 The black box con
necting these two components of Model 3 reflects these controversies
by linking technical assistance and agricultural development through
the choice of an aid strategy. Perhaps the critical strategic choice is
whether the aid focuses on project or policy assistance, a topic which
is now receiving much attention in the donor community, with results
that are beginning to show in world markets.
Model 3 shows two additional components relative to the simple struc
ture of Model 2. A connection between a country's agricultural imports
and the volume of U.S. agricultural exports is mediated by factors deter
mining the competitiveness of U.S. commodities in international markets,
especially exchange rates and domestic pricing policies, as well as by
market development efforts by the United States, including the role of
the PL-480 program. But the United States is concerned with not only
the volume of agricultural exports but their value as well. To connect
volume with value, it is necessary to determine the price received for
the exported commodity. This connection is shown in Model 3 by the
black box that contains the mechanisms of price formation in interna
tional commodity markets. This particular black box contains many of
the global general equilibrium mechanisms that provide cause for con
cern that the historical record of the 1960s and 1970s will not play out
so nicely for American farmers in the 1980s and 1990s.
Just as in Model 2, all of the expected statistical relationships con
tained in the black boxes in Model 3 are positive in sign. Considerable
debate exists, however, over the two relationships at the bottom. There
is no doubt that the total volume of U.S. grain exports, for example,
is positively related to the volume of world trade in grain. But figure
4 shows that the structure of that relationship depends critically on the
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Figure 3
Relationship Between Technical Assistance and the Value
of United States Agricultural Exports
Expected
Statistical
Relationship
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Figure 4
Relationship Between Percentage Change in World Grain Trade
and Percentage Change in United States Grain Exports

% Change U S. Grain Trade

% Change World

Expected Relationship. U-S. Supplier of Last Resort

Statistical Relationship:
% change in U.S. grain trade=-0.0311 +1.861 x % change in world grain trade
(1960-1984)
(1.4) (8.2)
R2 =0.743 D-W=2.16
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role of the United States in world grain markets. If, as many analysts
have argued, the United States has become the de facto "supplier of
last resort," the slope of the line that relates percentage changes in the
volume of world grain trade to percentage changes in U.S. grain ex
ports will be significantly greater than one. If the U.S. were a large
but fully competitive country, the slope should be approximately one.
If the United States were a small country in world grain trade, the slope
should not be significantly different from zero. For the 25 years be
tween 1960 and 1984 the coefficient was 1.86 and the r-statistic 8.2.
An additional issue concerns the strength of the relationship between
the volume of U.S. agricultural exports and the value of those exports.
If there were a fixed and known elasticity of demand for those exports,
the sign could be determined unambiguously. But that elasticity is an
outcome rather than a cause of the relationship. Again, three relation
ships are plausible, depending on the role of the United States in world
grain markets and the size and competitiveness of those markets. As
figure 5 illustrates, if the United States acts as a supplier of last resort,
there should be a positive relationship between changes in the price it
receives for grain exports and changes in the volume of those exports,
which thus guarantees a positive overall relationship between export
volume and export value.
If the United States is merely a regular competitor in world grain
markets, there should be no significant relationship between its export
volume and price received. If the United States acts as a large com
petitor in pursuit of market share in world grain markets, however, a
significant negative relationship should exist between its export volume
and price. This is the critical elasticity of demand for U.S. exports that
is needed to determine whether export volume and value are positively
related under this trade strategy, but it is precisely the elasticity that
is unobservable from historic data if previous policy has not pursued
this strategy. The statistical record for the same 25 years shows no signifi
cant relationship between percentage changes in either nominal or
deflated world grain prices and percentage changes in U.S. grain ex
ports, with or without a one-year lag, although the sign is always negative
in the estimated functions.
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Figure 5
Relationship Between Percentage Change in United States
Grain Exports and Export Price of Grain
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The question can now be put directly: what is known from Model
3 about the relationship between technical assistance and agricultural
development in developing countries at the one end and the volume and
value of U.S. agricultural exports at the other? The historical record
suggests that each black box is likely to encompass a set of mechanisms
that generate a net positive relationship between the input factor and
the resulting output. If all the black boxes have positive signs, the overall
relationship between agricultural development and U.S. agricultural ex
ports should also be positive. This is exactly the result that Kellogg and
his colleagues have found. So we have some confidence that Model 3
captures the short-run and panial equilibrium mechanisms connecting
these two factors.
Two potentially important elements are missing in Model 3. First,
the short-run links treated in Model 3 may be superimposed on more
powerful, but lagged, connections that operate in the opposite direc
tion. Some of these lagged relationships are economic but some work
primarily through political choices made in the face of pressures
emanating from the outcomes in Model 3. Second, price formation in
world commodity markets cannot be treated in a partial equilibrium
framework. The potential commodity substitutions and impact of finan
cial variables such as debt and exchange rates have a powerful influence
on these prices, which in turn enter the economic and political feed
back mechanisms just noted. When these concerns are added to the linear
format of Model 3, a much more complex set of relationships emerges,
as is shown in Model 4 in figure 6.
The unidirectional causation of Model 3 gives way in Model 4 to
several circular feedback mechanisms. Two have already been noted:
the impact of inward- or outward-looking development strategies on
the rate of economic growth and import demand; and the impact of food
policy on agricultural development and its mediating role between that
development and overall economic growth. 14
The broader feedback mechanisms incorporate connections from both
markets and political economy dynamics. On the left side of figure 6,
signals from world commodity markets influence both agricultural
development and economic growth, although with various lags. To the
extent that market prices are communicated directly to farmers, the
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Figure 6
Feedback Effects in the Relationship Between Technical Assistance
and the Value of United States Agricultural Exports
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crucial issue is the supply responsiveness of a nation's farmers to price
incentives. This responsiveness is obviously a function of time and of
public sector responsiveness as well. At the farm level, farmers might
shift the area devoted to various commodities in the short run, or change
fertilizer applications. In the longer run they can invest in water con
trol, better production technology, and greater specialization if the market
will take away their output and provide ample supplies of needed
household consumption items in return.
The influence of world commodity markets on economic growth is
through different mechanisms. By determining the amount of foreign
exchange earned for a given volume of commodity exports, these markets
directly influence how binding the foreign exchange constraint is. At
the same time, the signals provide incentives to local entrepreneurs to
supply export markets as opposed to domestic markets. Depressed world
commodity markets tend to lead to depressed domestic markets through
local price competition. Consequently, in those countries that permit
relatively free transmission of world market prices into their domestic
economies, a strong link exists between those markets and performance
in agricultural development and overall economic growth. If one con
sequence of previous rapid agricultural development (and other factors
influencing commodity prices) is to push down those prices on world
commodity markets, then at least one market mechanism is established
that will dampen further agricultural development and economic growth
and thereby lead to a reduction in demand from developing countries
for commodities from these markets.
The right side of figure 6 shows that there are important political
economy mechanisms that establish this connection as well. Growing
agricultural imports, especially at high prices, induce countries to devote
more attention to their agricultural sectors to reduce their political ex
posure to unstable world markets. This wariness must be one of the
major outcomes of the world food crisis in the mid-1970s. Some of
the high prices of that period were felt directly by farmers as countries
simply lost control of their domestic price stabilization programs. More
important for the long run, however, was the signal to governments
that it would be both expensive and politicially dangerous to rely on
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world markets for basic grains, a lesson that was reinforced by the soy
bean embargo and Soviet grain embargo attempted by the United States.
The result was implementation of price policies with better incentives
for farmers, more investment in rural infrastructure such as roads and
irrigation, and far more serious attention to the development of an in
digenous agricultural research and extension capacity (all of which are
now the ingredients of "good" policy advice).
All of these changes take time to manifest themselves in terms of in
creased output, but when it arrives on domestic markets, a double-edged
effect is felt on import demand from world commodity markets. Higher
real prices in domestic markets induce both greater production and reduc
ed demand. The result is sharply reduced import demand or even a switch
to exports of important food and feed grains, as in the case of Indonesia,
China, and India. If related factors such as falling petroleum prices and
high debt levels are contributing to slowed economic growth in lowand middle-income countries, the added market supplies meet very slug
gish growth in demand and thus exacerbate the downward price pressures
on agricultural commodity markets. In a rather perverse twist, the fall
ing petroleum prices and attempts to earn foreign exchange to meet debt
repayment schedules reinforce these dynamics because agricultural ex
ports have a shorter lead time and learning curve than industrial ex
ports and face less protection in developed countries (until now). A rather
vicious downward spiral is set in motion, which was initiated by an
apparently healthy response to the world food crisis of the 1970s and
the recycling of petrodollars.
How does the United States respond in such a situation? With surplus
agricultural commodities on hand and a stark picture of hunger televis
ed on the evening news, one temptation is to renew the market develop
ment thrust of the PL-480 program, to feed the hungry with America's
bounty. But the potential dangers to agricultural development efforts
of dumping our surpluses in substantial quantities into a country's
domestic food markets are now well recognized. 15 Most countries would
accept such food aid only if it directly offset commercial imports other
wise planned. Since this is contrary to both the letter and intent of the
law, sharply expanded PL-480 shipments do not seem possible.
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The commercial competitiveness of U.S. commodities is determin
ed primarily by the value of the dollar in foreign currency markets and
by domestic farm policy. Both of these factors are affected by prices
in world markets and, in turn, have feedback effects on the outcome
of each of the relationships shown in Model 4. Just as the devaluation
of the dollar in the early 1970s for reasons unconnected to agriculture
stimulated U.S. agricultural exports and farm earnings, so did its pro
gressive revaluation during the early 1980s dampen those exports and
earnings. The U.S. Congress does not legislate much positive agricultural
trade policy; it does, however, set domestic agricultural price policy
to protect farm incomes. The effect until the 1985 Farm Bill was to
set the prices of many U.S. export commodities above those of the com
petition and thus lose market share, which resulted in higher prices for
our competitors than would prevail with open competition.
The political economy dynamics of this approach are now becoming
clear. Large budget deficits forced Congress to design a more com
petitive farm price policy even in the face of existing low incomes in
the American farm sector (but large deficit costs remained because of
continued target price support). Additional commodities will move on
to world markets and drive prices down even further, at least temporarily.
The lower prices make imports even more attractive to those countries
open to international grain trade, but they simultaneously threaten fur
ther those countries that maintain active price policies on behalf of their
farmers. Providing better price incentives to farmers in developing coun
tries has become a main theme of policy advice that accompanies
technical and financial assistance. A major contradiction is emerging
between market signals and important elements in the agricultural
development process. As American farmers watch more and more coun
tries protect themselves from the pressures of low-priced U.S.
agricultural commodities, the political pressures will increase on the
land grant universities, USAID, and USD A to stop their assistance to
agricultural development programs. Slowing the pace of agricultural
development, however, will in fact slow the pace of economic growth
in the developing countries. They will then serve as less dynamic markets
for U.S. exports of all goods and services, including, in the short run,
exports of agricultural commodities.
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The Historical Record and Income-Led Growth
Despite the perilous and complicated feedback mechanisms that seem
to be operating in Model 4, the long-run growth of agricultural imports
in developing countries has been a stimulus to U.S. agricultural exports.
Figure 7 shows the shares of U.S. agricultural exports to various destina
tions for fiscal year 1976-77 and projected for 1984-85. The share of
developing countries, including China, rose from 35.5 percent in 1976-77
to 40.4 percent in 1984-85. The nominal value of total exports rose
roughly 60 percent during that time while the consumer price index
rose about 80 percent. After inflation, the real purchases of U.S.
agricultural commodities by developing countries remained almost con
stant, helping to offset a decline in the real value of purchases from
Western and Eastern Europe, Canada, and Oceania. Real purchases from
Japan and the U.S.S.R. increased significantly.
Two quite separate forces seem to be at work in generating the in
creased demand for agricultural imports in developing countries. The
first, and the smaller in absolute terms, is the failure of domestic
agricultural production to keep pace with population growth and food
demand in urban areas. This is primarily an African phenomenon. Table
1 shows that African imports of grain have increased from a total of
5.9 million metric tons in 1970 to an average of 24.9 million metric
tons for the 1980-83 period, or by 13.3 percent per year. During the
same period, production of corn, rice, and wheat increased 2.2 per
cent per year, substantially behind the 2.9 percent per year increase
in population. Real per capita incomes have also been falling during
this time, although certain regions and countries have shown signifi
cant increases. 16
The great bulk of increased demand for U.S. agricultural exports over
the past two decades has come from income-induced patterns of food
consumption. This is most readily apparent from table 2, which is
reproduced from Monke's paper on international grain trade for the
World Bank. 17 Total growth in import demand for cereals between
1948-52 and 1979-81 was over 170 million metric tons, of which Monke
attributes about 30 million metric tons to declines in per capita grain
production and about 33.5 million metric tons to population growth.

American Agriculture 107

Figure 7
U.S. Agricultural Export Percentage Shares to Selected Destinations
1976-77 and Projected 1984-85 Fiscal Years

Fiscal Yean 1976-77
Keatern Europe—36.5

Latin America—8.
Canada—6.6
Africa—5.6
Middle East—4.6
USSR—4.4
Eastern Europe—2
Oceania—0.6 Others-7.5

RepJtowo—8.9
People's Rep. China—0.003

Fiscal Year 1984-85
Latin America—13.9
Western
Canada—4

Europe—24.5

Africa—7.2
Middle East—4.8
USSR—10.2

Japan—17.6

Eastern Europe—2.0
Oceania—0.7

Taiwan S

Others—1.9

Rep. Korea—11.6

People's Rep. China—1.0

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Foreign Agricultural
Trade of the United States (Washington, D.C.), March-April 1985 and various other issues.
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The remainder, 107 million metric tons, is a residual that must be ac
counted for by rising per capita incomes, changing tastes, urbaniza
tion, and so on.
Table 1
African Grain Imports by Region in Millions of Metric Tons
1970 and Yearly Average 1980-83
Grain/Region
Corn
N. Africa
S. Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total
Rice
N. Africa
S. Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total
Wheat and Wheat Flour,
Wheat Equivalent
N. Africa
S. Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total

1970

1980-83

Percent change
1970 to 1980-83

.10
.20
.41

2.03
.37
1.46

+ 1930
+85
+256

.71

3.87

+445

.05
.08
.65

.25
.16
2.43

+400
+ 100
+274

.78

2.84

+264

2.79
.18
1.44

14.54
.14
3.52

+421
-22
+ 144

4.41

18.19

+312

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Trade Yearbook (Rome,
Italy), various issues.
Totals may not add up due to rounding.

The patterns of food demand generated by rising incomes have been
studied for well over a century, and Engels Law—the declining share
of food expenditures in total household expenditures as per capita in
comes rise—has been well-documented from both time series and cross

Table 2
Sources of Growth in Import Demand for Cereals
1948/52 - 1979/81
Effects on import demand of

Region

Total
growth

Declines in
per capita
production

Population
growth

Residual

44.56

(million metric tons)

Developed
Market economics
CPEs

46.02
46.30

9.33
0

17.83
1.74a

Developing
Market economics
Africa
Latin America
Near East
Far East
CPEs

58.34
(11.50)
(18.59)
(17.04)
(11.21)
19.58

19.02
(9.66)
(1.90)
(2.34)
(5.12)

10.80
(1.11)

Total

170.24

18.86

1.38

(4.04)
(1.80)
(3.83)
3.14a

28.52
(0.73)
(12.65)
(12.90)
(2.26)
15.06

29.73

33.51

107.00

SOURCE: Eric A. Monke, "International Grain Trade, 1950-80," AGREP Division Working Paper (Washington, D.C.. The World Bank, January 1983).
a. Calculations for CPEs are made for the 1960-80 penod, due to lack of data on intra-CPE trade for the 1948/52 period. Trade between market economics
and CPEs was extremely small during this period, but increased substantially during the 1950s. If per capita imports by CPEs during the 1948/52 period
were assumed equal to those of 1960, the effects of population growth on trade would increase to 2.77 and 4.15 million metric tons for the developed
and developing CPEs, respectively. These calculations yield overestimates, and do not alter the conclusions presented in the text.
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section data. The changing composition of the diet with rising incomes
has also been scrutinized as agricultural ministries search for com
modities with bright prospects for consumer demand in order to max
imize the payoff to their research and extension efforts. 18
Relatively less attention has been given to the indirect demand for
commodities generated by the food consumption patterns of the more
affluent. In 1974, Lester Brown presented a striking table showing the
indirect demand for grain at income levels at which grain-fed livestock
products became affordable. Grain demand per capita in the United States
and Canada, for example, totaled five times the amount in India or
China. 19 In times of grain shortages and pessimism over future sup
plies, this large indirect demand for grain was interpreted as a threat
to the world's capacity to feed its poorer population. In times of surplus,
indirect demand for grain is seen as an important source of export
markets for U.S. farmers, and so it is worth examining the relation
ship between income and grain demand more closely.
The relationship depends heavily on the distinction between quantity
and quality of the diet. Both of these attributes change as incomes in
crease, but the quality dimension is much more income-elastic after
minimum caloric intake levels are reached. Tables 3 and 4 report the
results of a systematic attempt to quantify these different trends; Ap
pendix 1 shows the sources of data for the 34 countries in the sample
and the composition of the 117 cases drawn from those countries. The
income variable is measured in purchasing power parity as determined
by Kravis and his colleagues. Prices are measured with similar ad
justments to market or official exchange rates; consequently much of
the real income effect of different price levels between poor and rich
countries has already been captured in the income variable. Any
significance of the variable measuring food prices relative to nonfood
prices is thus capturing a pure substitution effect rather than an overall
market effect, which includes both the real income effect of price changes
as well as the substitution effect.
The first seven equations have log of caloric intake as the dependent
variable. For the total sample, per capita income has a very high ex
planatory power, and the income elasticity is equal to 0.20 when in
come is entered alone in Equation Cl. It remains as high as 0.15 in

Table 3
Elasticity Coefficients from Calorie Intake Regression Analysis
Using Double Logarithmic Functions
(r-statistics in parentheses)

Number

Equation
R2

Sample

Calorie intake
0.75
Cl

Total

C2

0.76

Total

C3

0.77

Total

C4

0.78

Total

C5

0.78

Total

C6

0.04

DC

C7

0.60

LDC

Per capita
income
0.20
(18.77)
0.19
(16.04)
0.18
(13.77)
0.15
(9.07)
0.15
(8.58)
0.06
(1.30)
0.15
(8.67)

_ . .
Food prices
Calorie
r
Low income requirement
Overall

Constant
terms
7.24

-0.10
(1.37)

-0.12
(1.46)
-0.05
(0.30)
-0.10
(1.48)

7.32

-0.20
(2.44)
0.81
(3.58)
0.70
(2.96)

1.08
1.96
7.84
7.38

2.
o
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3
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Table 4
Elasticity Coeffkients for Various Aspects of Diet Quality
Using Double Logarithmic Regression Functions
(f-statistics in parentheses)
Equation
Number

R2

Per capita income
Sample

Starchy staple ratio
Ql

0.74

Total

Q2

0.75

Total

Q3

0.80

Total

Q4

0.80

Total

Q5

0.56

DC

Q6

0.41

LDC

Q7

0.64

Total

Q8

0.01

DC

Q9

0.22

LDC

Animal Protein
Q10
0.81

Total

Protein

Qll

0.41

DC

Q12

0.52

LDC

Overall
-0.39
(18.25)
-0.35
(11.50)
-0.67
(10.13)
-0.67
(10.19)
-0.64
(8.25)
-0.23
(6.39)
0.25
(14.32)
0.04
(0.85)
0.15
(4.11)
0.77
(22.39)
0.47
(6.19)
0.65
(8.03)

Low
income

Constant terms
Overall

Low
income

Miscellaneous
variables

-1.56
(5.31)
-1.60
(5.46)

0.245
(1.50)

5.07

0.03
(1.57)
0.45
(5.57)
0.45
(5.58)

4.92
6.22
6.22
6.09
4.69

3.46
4.36
3.69

0.72
2.00
0.97
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Equation C5 when variables are included for calorie requirements (which
reflect average body size, activity levels, and climate) and for price
response in low-income countries.
When the price variable is added in Equation C2, the income elasticity
drops only slightly; the price elasticity is -0.1 and significant only at
the 10 percent level. Prices and incomes are negatively correlated after
the Kravis adjustments, and so the income variable captures some of
the price effect. With prices alone in the equation, the estimated elasticity
rises in absolute value from -0.10 to -0.66.
The elasticities for developing countries are expected to be larger than
those for developed countries. The income elasticity should be higher
because caloric intake has physical limits—"the narrow confines of the
human stomach." The price elasticity estimated here, which is close
to a pure substitution effect, should be higher because of the "Timmer
effect," which states that "the pure substitution elasticity tends to decline
in absolute size as incomes rise at about half the rate of decline in in
come elasticities. . . ." 20
These issues are tested in Equations C6 and C7, which report separate
equations for subsamples of the developed and less-developed nations.
The income and price elasticities for developed countries are much lower
than those for the developing countries and were not statistically signifi
cant. The Timmer effect was roughly confirmed. The decline in income
elasticity from 0.15 for low-income countries to 0.06 for the high-income
countries represents a decline of 60 percent. The decline in the substitu
tion elasticity should therefore be about 30 percent. The actual decline
is 50 percent, but a 30 percent decline is well within the likely margin
or error.
The estimates of the "calorie requirement elasticity" in Equations
C4 and C5 have little operational meaning other than the obvious: a
1 percent increase in "requirements" does not automatically lead to
a 1 percent increase in caloric intake. Per capita incomes and food prices
play a critical role in determining whether requirements can actually
be satisfied.
Three measures of dietary quality are analyzed in table 4. Equation
Ql shows the starchy staple ratio regressed against income. The elasticity

114 Timmer

of -0.39 is highly significant and has substantial predictive power, as
the simple equation has an R2 of 0.74. Even the introduction of lowincome slope and intercept shifters, along with a price term, raises the
R2 only to 0.80. Per capita incomes are clearly the dominant factor ex
plaining this measure of dietary quality. To the extent a difference is
likely to exist in income elasticities for the starchy staple ratio, the
elasticity for developed countries should be larger in absolute terms.
This would happen partly because the population of poor countries would
exhibit a certain inertia in behavior—many wealthy individuals in Asia
do not feel they have "eaten" without rice at a meal. In addition, signifi
cant scope exists for upgrading the diets of low-income populations
within the context of starchy staples. Wheat can thus substitute for
sorghum, or maize for cassava, and then rice for maize. Only when
diets begin to diversify dramatically in quantitative terms to meat, sugar,
fish, milk, and other high-quality and expensive calories does the
starchy staple ratio decline rapidly.
This hypothesis is borne out in Equations Q5 and Q6. Separate equa
tions for developed and developing countries show that the income
elasticity of the starchy staple ratio is -0.64 and -0.23, respectively.
Both coefficients are highly significant. A different formulation in Equa
tion Q3 using dummy variables for low per capita incomes found vir
tually identical results.
The three equations for protein illustrate a characteristic of this par
ticular sample and a behavioral relationship of some significance. Equa
tion Q7 shows a protein-income elasticity of 0.25 when the total sam
ple is combined. When the sample is split, the elasticity for developed
countries is 0.04 and the low-income elasticity is 0.15. Neither elasticity
from the split sample is as high as from the combined sample. Normal
ly, the elasticity for the total sample should be a weighted average of
the two subsamples. That is not true here for two reasons. First, the
developed country sample represents a different population from that
of the developing country sample due to different calorie requirements
as well as to a host of other "modern'' traits that do not come immediate
ly with higher incomes. Second, patterns of behavior take considerable
time to adjust to changed income levels. The elasticities for each sam-
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pie separately can be thought of as representing short-run adjustments
to income change, whereas the elasticity for the combined sample
represents a long-run adjustment.
Equations Q10 to Q12 examine the relationship between animal pro
tein and incomes. The income elasticity for animal protein is 0.77 for
all countries but only 0.65 and 0.47 for developing and developed coun
tries, respectively, which again shows the potential importance of shortrun versus long-run dietary adaptations to income change. The implica
tions of these large income elasticities for animal protein can be seen
in table 5, which is patterned after Brown and reports both direct con
sumption of grain per capita and indirect consumption through livestock
feeding, for a variety of countries from the United States to India. 21
Despite direct intake of grain in the United States of almost exactly onehalf the Indian level, total grain consumed is 4.5 times as large as In
dia's total grain consumption per capita—646 kilograms per years as
opposed to 143 kilograms. The level was even higher before U.S.
livestock feeders sharply reduced their feeding of grain in the wake of
high grain prices in the mid-1970s.
A significant impact will be felt on world grain markets if' 'follower''
countries adopt American-style diets and the indirect demand for grain
implicit in them. If all the countries from Japan and below in table 5
were to reach the average level of grain consumed in the United Kingdom
and Germany (340 kilograms per capita per year, a figure only slightly
more than half the United States level), more than 300 million metric
tons of additional grain would be needed, a figure equal to one-sixth
of global production of grain. Excluding both India and China from
the calculation leaves an added grain demand of more than 60 million
metric tons, more than one-quarter of world grain trade in recent years.
If income growth precedes rapidly in these countries, the derived de
mand for grain through increased meat consumption will be a major
factor determining the balance between supply and demand in world
grain markets. Failure of incomes to grow as rapidly as in the past,
however, will depress demand and could lead to significant grain
surpluses in years of good harvests. If, in addition, there has been a
structural change in the interaction of developing countries with world
grain markets, as was argued previously, the outlook for American
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grain farmers is bleak indeed. This bleak outlook stems not from "sur
prises" in the black boxes, that is, in fundamentally different mechanisms
connecting each level of a developing country's food system with the
next. Rather, the changed outlook comes through the relatively greater
importance of feedback mechanisms as income growth slows down. The
more that income growth is stimulated through assistance to agricultural
development, the more powerful will the feedback effects become. In
addition, a set of largely external factors are impinging to make the pros
pects for U.S. grain exports in the 1980s less favorable than they were
in the 1970s or even the 1960s. 22
Table 5
Annual Per Capita Grain Consumption in Selected Countries
1975-1977 Average

USA
USSR
Argentina
Germany
U.K.
Japan
Korea
Brazil
China
Philippines
Indonesia
India

Grain
consumed
directly
(kgs)

Grain
consumed
indirectly
(kgs)

Total grain
consumed
(kgs)

Total grain
consumed
as multiple
of India's
consumption

63
141
100
67
71
132
199
91
156
131
142
128

583
444
275
288
254
144
54
124
52
35
10
15

646
585
375
355
325
276
253
215
208
166
152
143

4.5
4.1
2.6
2.5
2.3
1.9
1.8
1.5
1.5
1.2
1.1
1.0

SOURCE: FAO, Food Balance Sheets, 1975-1977.
NOTE: Grain consumed indirectly is not corrected for imports and exports of meat and poultry.
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The first of these factors is the unusual pattern of economic growth
in the 1970s. The especially successful examples of agriculturally-led
economic growth spilling over into rising agricultural imports have been
in East Asia—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. All three countries have
very low ratios of land to population, and all have relied heavily on
industrial exports to the United States and Western Europe to fuel their
growth, which has been extraordinarily rapid by either historic or con
temporary comparative standards. While further gains in U.S.
agricultural exports to these markets are possible, the largest increases
have already been achieved. In addition, the United States faces sharp
competition for these markets from other Asian countries whose ex
port sectors have been stimulated by market-oriented food policies and
the new structure of world commodity markets. Thailand, China, and
Indonesia have the capacity to meet much of the rising demand for
feedgrains in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. If Burma and Indo-China
ever adopt market-oriented food policies that provide better farm in
centives and public infrastructure for improved agricultural productivity,
Asia could be awash in surplus grain.
The opportunities to reproduce the East Asian pattern of the 1960s
and 1970s are practically nil. The lucrative markets of the OECD coun
tries are increasingly closed to exports from newly industrializing coun
tries. To earn the foreign exchange needed to import capital goods and
to pay existing debt, most countries will be forced to export agricultural
rather than industrial goods. The result will be added competition in
world commodity markets, either directly as with rice, corn, soybeans,
or cotton, or indirectly as with palm oil, rubber, or jute. As more coun
tries seek sources of growth in agriculture, these competitive pressures
will increase, and commodity prices will remain depressed.
Second, the technological basis for agricultural development in the
1980s and 1990s is likely to be significantly different from that in the
1970s. The Green Revolution of the 1970s was primarily based on wheat
and rice systems with good water control. Much of the increase in U.S.
agricultural exports in the 1970s was in coarse grains and soybeans,
crops for which little new technology was applicable to the tropics.
Because of significant progress in breeding and cultivation techniques,
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substantially higher yields for most of the coarse grains are now possi
ble in the humid tropics, and similar progress may be in sight for
legumes. 23
A third factor depressing the outlook for U.S. agricultural exports
is the erosion of its cost advantage in producing higher value-added prod
ucts such as broilers, soymeal and oil, and textiles. When the basic com
modities that provide the raw materials for these products cost more
for domestic producers than they do for international competitors such
as Thailand, Brazil, or China, it is impossible to retain markets previous
ly established or to gain new ones. Between 1980-81 and 1983-84, the
export of oilseed meals and poultry dropped by 34.4 percent, whereas
overall U.S. agricultural exports fell by "only" 10.8 percent.
In total, three general sets of factors seem destined to make the> 1980s
a very different decade from the 1970s for American farmers: reduced
global rates of growth in incomes; general equilibrium feedback effects
on world commodity markets; and several specific features with respect
to countries, technologies, and cost structures. There is only a limited
response that U.S. policy can make in this new environment. Reduc
ing the value of the dollar by bringing government expenditures in closer
balance with revenues may raise the dollar price of commodities in world
markets and help make American farmers more competitive, but it will
make exports from developing countries less competitive and slow their
rate of growth. The net effect on commodity markets is not clearly
positive, and the dollar's decline since February 1985 has not helped
very much by early 1987.
A more competitive pricing structure for U.S. farm products will help
regain market share and also lower input costs for value-added prod
ucts. But it will also drive down prices in world markets, at least in
the short run, leaving basic commodity producers worse off.
United States technical assistance can focus on raising agricultural
productivity in developing countries and rely on historical relationships
to speed their economic growth and demand for agricultural imports.
But if the lagged feedback mechanisms from both the market and political
economy continue to push countries toward smaller food imports and
increased emphasis on agricultural exports, the general equilibrium con-
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sequences of this strategy mean it will backfire as a vehicle for assisting
American farmers.
One can only conclude that no solution exists to the problem of low
incomes of American farmers if the policy intends for present farmers
to produce more output at higher prices. A competition-oriented policy
that drives down world prices may eventually force some high-cost com
petitors, especially smaller farms in Europe, out of the market, but it
will lead to a significant shake-out of American producers as well. From
the comfort of a university it is easy to say that this is inevitable, even
good for farmers, because they will earn higher incomes in the industrial
or service sector. Jobs in those sectors, however, depend on the general
health of the United States economy, and this in turn depends on overall
American competitiveness and capacity to sell abroad. And this returns
the story to the very simple relationship in figure 1, in which economic
growth in developing countries leads to increased import demand in
general. Finding ways to help these countries speed their general develop
ment process is the critical task for the United States if it wants a healthy
economy at home. The evidence and logic point to rapid agricultural
development as the key to this process, even if it increases competitive
pressures on American agriculture through a complicated web of feed
back and general equilibrium processes. Policies that help farmers cope
with these pressures by easing the pain of structural change are the
only appropriate response.
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Appendix 1
Sources of Data
World Product and Income (1982) for real gross domestic income per capita
for 34 countries for the years 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1977 as well as for pur
chasing power parities for 1975.
FAO, Food Balance Sheets, 1972-1974 and 1975-1977 for data on nutrient
availability.
FAO, Fourth World Food Survey, 1977, for data on calorie requirements.
U.N., Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, Volume n, 1979, for real
GDP per capita growth rates.
ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1979, for general and food price indices.
The 34 countries in the sample, with the number of observations for each,
are as follows:

Austria (3)
Hungary (2)
Luxembourg (4)
Spain (4)
Germany (4)

Developed countries
Denmark (4)
Belgium (4)
Ireland (4)
Italy (4)
Poland (1)
Netherlands (4)
United States (4)
United Kingdom (4)

France (4)
Japan (4)
Romania (1)
Yugoslavia (1)

17 countries; 56 cases

Less-developed countries
Brazil (3)
Jamaica (3)
Malaysia (4)
Sri Lanka (4)
Zambia (3)

Colombia (4)
Kenya (4)
Mexico (4)
Syria (3)

17 countries; 61 cases
TOTAL SAMPLE: 34 countries; 117 cases

India (3)
Korea (4)
Pakistan (4)
Thailand (4)

Iran (4)
Malawi (3)
Philippines (3)
Uruguay (4)

Ending African Hunger
Six Challenges for Scientists,
Policymakers and Politicians
Carl K. Eicher
Michigan State University
Nineteen-sixty is usually referred to as the beginning of Africa's in
dependence movement because 16 African colonies won their in
dependence in that year. Over the 1960 to 1985 period, however, at
least 40 of the 45 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa wasted a generation
in failing to develop their agriculture as an engine of growth of their
national economies. After several decades of independence, Africa is
still the poorest part of the world's economy and seven of every ten
Africans live in rural areas. The dreams of African leaders of skipping
stages of development and catching up with the rich countries in one
or two generations have all but vanished, as despair, frustration and
disappointment have become the code words in African political circles.
When African countries started to reclaim their independence in the
1960s, Sub-Saharan Africa was a modest net exporter of food—mostly
groundnuts (peanuts) and palm oil to Europe. But Africa slowly lost
its capacity to feed itself during the sixties. The situation deteriorated
further in the seventies with the drought and famine in the Sahelian region
of West Africa. During the 15-year period from 1970 to 1984, Africa's
population grew at twice the rate of growth of food production. In 1985,
25 years after independence, 22 African states appealed to the interna
tional community for emergency food aid and 300,000 people died in
the Great Ethiopian Famine.
In Africa's first 25 years of independence, only four or five of the
forty-five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa gave priority to agriculture
and to feeding their people. The remaining countries paid lip service
The research supporting this chapter was financed by the U.S. Agency for International Develop
ment, Bureau for Science and Technology and Bureau for Africa, under a "Food Security in
Africa" cooperative agreement with the Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State
University.
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to agriculture while emphasizing industrialization, state control and the
taxation of agriculture. In this essay, I shall look back 25 years and
examine why Africa wasted a generation in developing its agricultural
base. I shall then look ahead and examine what can be done to end hunger
in Africa over the next 25 years. I have taken the long view, i.e., the
long pull—because there is little that can be done over the next five
to ten years to slow population growth and end hunger in Africa.
Hunger can be defined as the inability of households to produce, pur
chase or acquire a calorie-adequate diet throughout the year. I shall
focus on calories rather than protein because recent research has shown
that, with the exception of pregnant women and nursing mothers, the
protein needs of most people can be met if enough calories are con
sumed from multiple sources.
Although there are currently more hungry people in Asia than in Africa
because of the sheer size of Asia's population relative to Africa, the
most challenging and intractable problems of hunger and famine are
in Sub-Saharan Africa: an immense land area of 45 countries, 7 col
onial histories, and more than 1,000 different ethnic groups. 1 Moreover,
most Asian countries have made enormous progress over the past few
decades in controlling famine before it becomes a local or national
disaster. For example, the last major famine in Asia occurred in
Bangladesh in 1974 when 1.5 million people perished. In Africa,
however, famine has not been brought under control. Famine in the
Sahelian zone of West Africa in the early 1970s was followed by the
Great African Famine in Ethiopia and Somalia of 1985.
Since Africa is an integral part of the international food equation,
I shall examine the goal to end hunger in Africa in an international con
text, including the use of donor assistance and food aid in increasing
food production and access to food. The hallmark of the world food
equation of the late 1980s is underproduction of food in many African
countries, overproduction in industrial nations such as the United States,
Canada, Europe, Japan and Australia, and emerging overproduction
of food in some Third World nations such as Brazil and India. For ex
ample, India recently joined the ranks of food aid donors when it
delivered 100,000 tons of food aid to Africa in 1985. India plans to
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donate 35,000 tons of grain to Africa in 1987. Although India's achieve
ment of food self-sufficiency and its generosity to Africa are to be ad
mired, it should be pointed out that roughly 200 million or one-fourth
of India's population are hungry and unable to acquire a calorie-adequate
diet. The hungry in India are the landless, jobless, poor, and the destitute
who are unable to produce, purchase or acquire enough calories to lead
a normal life. Under these circumstances, why should India ship food
aid to Africa except to gain political capital? Th lesson that emerges
from India's experience for Africa is that the expansion of food pro
duction and the achievement of national food self-sufficiency will not
automatically end hunger.
It is important to debate African hunger in the United States because
there is a great deal of misinformation and facile slogans being peddl
ed on the need for Africans to produce more food and fewer cash crops,
the belief that hunger can be ended simply by increasing food produc
tion and the belief in some circles that hunger in Africa is caused by
multinational firms and international capitalism.
I have chosen to discuss six challenges for ending hunger in Africa:
1. The challenge of learning why the first generation of African
political leaders, policymakers, and their foreign advisors under
valued agriculture and food production over the 1960-84 period,
2. The challenge of slowing rapid population growth,
3. The human capital challenge,
4. The challenge of focusing on the prime movers of increasing food
and agricultural production,
5. The challenge of reducing poverty and increasing access to food,
6. The challenge of reordering foreign aid priorities.

The Challenge of Learning from the Mistakes
of the First Generation of African Leaders
and Their Foreign Advisors: 1960 to 1985
Two essential questions must be addressed in an analysis of the poor
performance of agriculture in the postindependence period. First, what
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role did African states assign to agriculture and the industrial sectors
in national development strategies in the 1960s and 1970s? Second, what
strategies were used by African states to increase food and agricultural
production?
The postindependence experience provides a clear answer to the first
question. Most western economic advisors to African governments in
the 1960s promoted industrialization, rural to urban migration, and the
taxation of agriculture. With the exception of a few countries such as
the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Rwanda, Kenya and Malawi, African
political leaders undervalued agriculture and gave priority to industrial
development at the same time the agriculture sector was usually heavi
ly taxed to finance industrial projects and the urban symbols of moder
nization such as a soccer stadium, a new House of Parliament and a
four-lane highway from the international airport to independence square
in the capital city.
In the 1960s, most African heads of state did not believe in investing
in the agricultural sector because of the view that industrialization of
fered the most rapid avenue to change the structure of African economies
from traditional agrarian/export-dominated economies to modern in
dustrial economies. But in practice, industrialization has proven to be
more complex than imagined. Throughout Africa, industrial plants are
now standing idle because of inefficiency, mismanagement, corruption
and lack of markets. For example, while visiting Tanzania in October
of 1985,1 observed that the government-owned shoe factory in Morogoro
that was financed by a World Bank loan was operating at 4.5 percent
of capacity. I also observed that the cashew nut processing plants were
standing idle because it was cheaper to ship raw cashew nuts to India
for hand shelling because the unskilled wage in India was substantially
lower than in Tanzania.
Why did most African heads of state impose such heavy taxes on
agriculture for financing large-scale industrial projects? There is con
sistent evidence that African heads of state in anglophone and fran
cophone states associated poverty and underdevelopment with colonial
strategies of producing agricultural exports—sisal, cocoa, oil palm, rub
ber and coffee—for European markets. Whether the head of state was
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espousing capitalism or socialism, there was a view that continued in
vestment in export crops for overseas markets would be risky and would
continue Africa's dependence on western markets. This point of view
is reflected in the late Walter Rodney's immensely popular book in
African universities—How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1974).
Houphet-Boigny—the President of the Ivory Coast and Hastings Banda, Life President of Malawi, are shining examples of veteran politi
cians who promoted agricultural development over the past 25 years.
Blessed with a rich natural resource base, adequate rainfall and an opendoor policy to immigrants from neighboring countries, today the Ivory
Coast is a middle-income nation with a per capita income several times
higher than that of Ghana even though Ghana was by far the richest
country in West Africa at independence in 1958. Malawi, a landlocked
country with a poor natural resource base, is not only self-sufficient
in maize, the staple food, but it has exported maize for seven of the
past ten years.
Over the past three to five years there has been a growing awareness
among new African leaders such as Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of
Zimbabwe, President Diouf of Senegal, and President Mwinyi of Tan
zania, that an agriculture-led development strategy should be pursued
in economies where 70 to 90 percent of the people live in rural areas
and petroleum and minerals are not available to generate adequate foreign
exchange. However, because of the diversity of Africa's natural resource
base and opportunities for development, there is no single agricultural
development model that can be advocated for Africa. The relative em
phasis that a national development strategy gives to industry, mining
and/or agriculture must be sorted out on a country-to-country basis.
But we can conclude after 25 years of independence that most African
states are starting to give greater priority to investment in agriculture
and less to industry than they did five to ten years ago.
The second question—how to develop agriculture—was answered in
most African states in the 1960s by narrow assumptions about African
farmers and herders and a belief in the ease of importing agricultural
technology and models of production (e.g., large-scale farms and
ranches) from industrial countries. In Africa, in the 1960s—as in Asia and
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Latin America in the 1950s—farmers and livestock owners were assumed
to be irrational, inefficient and bound to a culture of tradition and poverty.
It was also assumed by many African leaders and their foreign advisors
that large-scale farms, plantations and ranches were more efficient than
small farms. Throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s, African govern
ments, donors and foreign advisors assumed that food crop technology
was ' 'on the shelf' or that it could be imported from temperate climates
in Europe and North America. It was further assumed that the adop
tion of improved technology could be speeded up by increasing the
number of extension agents to "educate" farmers on the need to spend
less time on feasts, festivals and sorghum beer parties and more time
on increasing food production. Many African governments followed
this advice and from 1959 to 1980, the 45 countries in Africa hired
an additional 50,000 extension agents under the mistaken assumption
that extension agents, rather than technical packages, 2 were the miss
ing link in developing African agriculture.
With few exceptions, the first generation of African leaders, whether
they were the leaders of civilian, military, radical or conservative
regimes—were consistent in giving priority to industrial/urban develop
ment, exploiting farmers and rural people by imposing harsh taxes on
export crops and giving rural people little voice in setting national
agriculture policies and development priorities. The first generation also
failed to understand that agricultural development is a slow, evolutionary
and complex process that does not lend itself to rhetoric, ideology or
to crash food production campaigns. Since most countries wasted a
generation in developing their agriculture, the challenge for the second
generation of African leaders is to learn from the mistakes of the past
in addressing the challenge of developing African agriculture and end
ing hunger. But the bottom line is that many older African leaders must
be replaced with a new generation who realize that Africa's poverty
and underdevelopment is, to a large extent, the result of misguided na
tional development strategies that gave priority to industrialization rather
than strengthening the agricultural base as a precondition for industrial
development.
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The Challenge of Slowing Rapid Population Growth
Africa's 3.2 percent annual rate of population growth is the highest
in the world. In fact, the total population in the region is estimated to
increase from 460 million in 1985 to 730 million in year 2000, an in
crease of almost 300 million in just 15 years. The total fertility ratethe average number of children born during a woman's lifetime—is 6.9
in Africa, the highest in the world. 3
Looking ahead, most population experts are of the opinion that fer
tility rates will remain high for the next 10 to 20 years because of the
following reasons:
1. Erosion of the Custom ofAbstinence. In many countries, the custom
of abstaining from sex after a child is born ranges from 40 days
in some Islamic groups to two years for some ethnic groups in
Central and West Africa. When abstinence exceeds a year, it is
usually continued until the child is weaned from the breast. This
can lead to a spacing as much as four years between children. But
the custom of abstinence is eroding, thus raising fertility.
2. From Breast to Bottle Feeding. The biological process of breast
feeding suppresses ovulation up to two years for the most pro
longed breast feeders. But the aggressive advertising of powdered
milk and baby formula is leading to a shift from breast to bottle
feeding, thus contributing to higher fertility rates.
3 . Slow Adoption of Contraceptives. Knowledge about contraceptives
is low in Africa. Two-thirds of women in Cameroon have never
heard of them. Among the women in Kenya exposed to contracep
tives, only 12 percent use them. Fewer than 5 percent of women
exposed to contraceptives in Senegal—a Moslem country—use them
(Bongaarts, Odele and Lesthaeghe 1984).
African attitudes toward rapid population growth are changing,
however. In 1984, 40 African nations met in Kenya and adopted the
Kilimanjaro Program of Action for Population that calls for family plan
ning services to be made available to all couples—either free or at sub
sidized prices. Zimbabwe has recently become the first African nation
to achieve a statistically verified reduction in fertility levels. More than
35 percent of urban women now use contraceptives in Zimbabwe.
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Two demographic lessons emerge from the historical experience of
the past 25 years. First, African heads of state, donor agencies and scien
tists have underestimated the acceleration of the annual rate of popula
tion growth from 2.6 percent in th early 1960s to an Africa average
of 3.2 percent today. Second, political leaders and population experts
have underestimated the valid economic reasons why rural families want
more children and the length of time and resources that would be re
quired to slow population growth rates. Under conditions of surplus
land and the lack of a state social security service, children can make
a positive economic contribution to their families by fetching firewood,
cutting grass for animals, as well as providing support for their parents
in their old age.
Western science currently has no proven technology to slow Africa's
rapid population growth. For Americans obsessed with technological
fixes, it is difficult to realize that flooding Africa with contraceptives
is not the answer. The high fertility and population growth rates can
only be slowed gradually through more improvements in health,
women's schooling, and the reduction of poverty and infant mortality.
In summary, rapid population growth will exert pressure on the natural
resource base throughout the continent. Africa's current 3.2 percent
rate of population growth is roughly triple the rate of growth of popula
tion in presently industrial countries like Denmark and the Netherlands
at a comparable stage in their economic history from 1850 to 1900,
and in Japan from 1878 to 1912. Because of Africa's rapid rate of popula
tion growth, policies for increasing food production and slowing popula
tion growth must be conceptualized as long-term efforts because fer
tility rates are simply not going to plummet over the next five to ten
years. The agonizing lesson that flows from the historical experience
since 1960 is that slowing the population growth rate—like increasing
food production—is a slow, evolutionary, stepwise process.

The Human Capital Challenge
When African nations started to reclaim their independence in the
early 1960s, illiteracy rates exceeded 90 percent in many countries and

Ending African Hunger 131

drop-out rates were high. Moreover, the stock of university graduates
was exceedingly low—around 100 in Zambia—at independence and the
enrollment ratio of students enrolled in post-high school and univer
sities was less than 1 percent. Moreover, Sub-Saharan African coun
tries had one-fourth the number of skilled manpower per million peo
ple in 1970 that Asian countries had in 1960.
Looking back over the past 25 years, Africa has made enormous gains
in education at all levels, especially up to around 1980. For example,
the number of students enrolled in all levels—primary, secondary and
post-secondary (includes technical schools and universities), increased
fivefold over the 1970 to 1983 period. Despite these impressive
achievements, however, there is growing evidence that 1980 was a turn
ing point for education in Africa. Although total African expenditure
on all levels of education grew from $3.8 billion in 1970 to $10.0 billion
in 1980, total expenditure fell by 11 percent between 1980 and 1983.
Moreover, the 8.4 percent annual rate of growth of primary schooling
between 1970 and 1980 fell to 2.9 percent from 1980 to 1983. If the
rate of primary school enrollment (2.9 percent) does not keep up with
Africa's population growth of 3.2 percent, Africa's educational base
will be eroded.
Africa's educational problems have been studied by a World Bank
task force over the past two years. The core recommendation of the
task force is to reduce the share of public investment on universitylevel education and to increase expenditures on primary and secondary
education. This recommendation will be hotly criticized by leaders of
African universities because they believe that shifting the relative mix
of resources to primary and secondary schooling will make it difficult
for Africa to develop its scientific capacity and reduce the number of
expatriate teachers and researchers.
The development of higher education in Africa should be examined
in historical perspective. When African nations became independent in
the early 1960s, they were encouraged to import technology from in
dustrial countries, to send Africans overseas for agricultural training
and to rely on tens of thousands of teachers and technical advisors
(technical assistance) to fill manpower gaps until students returned from
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overseas training. The desire for overseas training was reinforced by
African leaders such as President Senghor of Senegal, a distinguished
poet and leader of Senegal from independence in 1960 until he
volunteered to retire in December 1980. Although Senghor personally
encouraged Senegalese students to study business administration in the
United States, one can legitimately pose the question: Why did Presi
dent Senghor wait until 1979—19 years after independence—to start
undergraduate training in agriculture in Senegal? This is a puzzle that
merits closer examination because Senegal is a profoundly agrarian coun
try with 70 percent of its people engaged in agriculture. The 19-year
time gap cannot be blamed on French colonial policies. It is a reflec
tion of the ambivalent attitude that Senghor and most first generation
African leaders had for developing indigenous scientific capacity in food
and agriculture.
After 25 years of independence, Africa is still heavily dependent on
international advisors in most scientific and technical fields. For ex
ample, in the early 1980s, about $4 billion or half of the annual official
foreign aid (public) to Africa was used to pay the salaries, and "care
and feeding" of approximately 80,000 western experts (about 40,000
school teachers, and 40,000 expatriate advisors, managers, teachers and
scientists). But the provision of Western (and to a lesser extent Eastern
Bloc) technical assistance to Africa is coming under heavy attack because
of its high cost ($100,000 to $150,000 per person per year), its rapid
turnover, and its uneven quality. Overseas training is also under heavy
attack because of the growing awareness among Africans that it is a
stop gap measure for the inevitable decision that will have to be made
to strengthen Africa's capacity to train its students at home.
Sending foreign advisors to Africa and training Africans in the United
States are politically popular to American taxpayers. Both activities con
tribute to the 75 percent of all American foreign aid that is currently
returned to the United States in the form of tuition payments, salaries
paid to American advisors, and income derived from the sale of U.S.
products—fertilizer, wheat, rice and tractors—for African states. But
there is a puzzle in the human capital equation that should be critically
examined. Why did the U.S. government take the long view in India
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in the 1960s when it helped develop 23 new state agricultural univer
sities and fund their development for the next 15 years? Why is the
United States taking the short-run view in Africa in the 1980s?
Unfortunately little leadership is coming from Africa on educational
reform. African universities are notoriously overstaffed, inefficient and
expensive. For example, in 1980-81, Nigerian universities employed
52,000 staff (teachers, cooks, guards, servants) for a student popula
tion of 69,000. By contrast, 8,300 employees care for 67,000 students
in the 16 public colleges and universities in the state of West Virginia
in 1987 (New York Times 1987). Since virtually the total cost of a univer
sity education in Africa is paid for by the government, it is privately
profitable for African families to send their children to universities. But
the returns to society for university-level education are low under the
present cost structure and priorities where students are trained in fields
such as law, history, geography and political science instead of fields
dominated by western advisors such as computer science, business ad
ministration, engineering and plant science.
Africa has inherited an elitist model of higher education from the
British, French, German and Portuguese. Because of the bleak finan
cial position of many African countries, higher education is now under
stress and the quality of education is falling in many universities. A
few countries are starting to introduce long overdue structural innova
tions, including the development of new university models that are rele
vant to the agrarian dominated continent. For example, Tanzania recently
started a new agricultural university—Sokoine University of
Agriculture—that is modeled after the Punjab state agricultural univer
sity in India, a university established in the 1960s with the assistance
of U.S. foreign aid and technical support from Ohio State University.
Ethiopia recently launched the Alemaya University of Agriculture at
AJemaya.
The 25 major foreign aid donors in Africa, including the flagship
donor—the World Bank—do not have a strategic plan on how to break
the "iron grip" of fellowships for overseas training and providing
technical experts to Africa. The time is ripe for a fundamental reexamination of human capital strategies in Africa. Most donors have
retreated from investment in human capital. For example, Uma Lele
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of the World Bank reports that World Bank lending to education in Africa
declined from 10.6 percent of African allocation in the 1960s, to 7.5
percent during the 1970s, and 4.1 percent over the 1980-84 period (Lele
1987, p. 326). In fact, in fiscal year 1984, the World Bank allocated
only two educational loans to Africa totaling $25 million. The major
western donors are standing on the sidelines supplying fellowships for
overseas training and short-term technical assistance while studiously
avoiding making the long-term commitment of funds and teachers for
long-term human capital institution building projects that were routinely
offered to Columbia, Brazil and Argentina in the 1950s and 1960s and
to India and other Asian nations in the 1960s and 1970s.
In a continent with large amounts of idle land and energetic people,
what strikes one most about Africa's underdevelopment is the dispropor
tionate stock of skilled people between Africa and the rich countries
and between Africa and Latin America and Asia. The challenge now
is to assess the experience of the first 25 years of independence and
to lay the groundwork for helping African nations develop new models
of education that are more cost-effective, relevant and sustainable.

The Challenge of Focusing Policy Attention on the Prime Movers
of Increasing Food and Agricultural Production

Because of favorable rainfall throughout most of Africa in 1985-87,
the short-term food outlook for Africa is good. In fact, 12 African coun
tries had grain surpluses in 1987. However, because of rapid popula
tion growth, Africa faces a major agricultural production challenge.
Food supplies will have to be doubled every 17 to 25 years to keep
up with rapid population growth. The agricultural sector of African na
tions will also have to generate jobs, new income streams for rural people
and foreign exchange to enable national economies to import capital
goods such as tractors, construction material, and mining equipment.
However, African heads of state are being inundated with fragmented
advice from Western donors and their advisors on how to increase and
sustain annual food production growth rates of 3 to 5 percent over the
next generation.
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Over the past 25 years of working on African development problems,
I have noted that planning for increasing food and agricultural produc
tion in Africa is heavily biased by the faddish and narrow views of the
several dozen major donors, private voluntary agencies and legions of
Western academic specialists who typically play up the role of a single
factor of agricultural change such as new technology or pricing policy.
Many of these academic specialists are zealously promoting the cur
rent fad of donors or their discipline. For example, many plant breeders
are understandably preoccupied with a technological fix to Africa's food
problems and in placing more emphasis on regenerative agriculture.
Anthropologists are rightly concerned with the cultural barriers to ex
panded livestock offtake rates. Agricultural economists typically focus
on one issue such as: credit, land reform or raising farm prices, while
general economists are concerned with overvalued exchange rates and
measures to speed market liberalization.
In a world of increasing specialization and a concern for quick fixes,
there is an urgent need to move beyond single factors of agricultural
development and focus on what I call the five prime movers of
agricultural development as a policy package over the long pull. 4 These
five prime movers of increasing food and agricultural production are:
1. New technology produced by public and private investments in
agricultural research.
2. Human capital and managerial skills produced by investments in
schools, training centers, and on-the-job experience.
3. Biological capital investments (e.g., improving livestock herds)
and physical capital investment in infrastructure such as dams, ir
rigation, and roads.
4. Improvement in the performance of institutions such as market
ing, credit and national agricultural research and extension services.
5. Favorable economic policy environment.
A significant characteristic of the first four prime movers is their long
gestation period (10 to 25 years). For example, experience has shown
that it takes ten years of research, on the average, to produce a new
plant variety, and another five to eight years to gain widespread farmer
adoption. It takes 10 to 15 years of research on the average to develop
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new technology for increasing livestock production. It takes 10 to 15
years of graduate study and on-the-job training for an agricultural
research scientist to be productive. Unfortunately this time span is not
being reflected in African development plans or in Western foreign aid
programs that too often move from one short-term fad to another.
The second characteristic of the prime movers of agricultural develop
ment is their complementary nature and the need to develop an integrated
investment plan for research, extension, training, etc. The payoff to
investment to produce new food, cash crop and livestock and technology
will be low unless there is an effective extension service to diffuse the
new technology. Likewise, the payoff to investing in agricultural ex
tension services in Africa has generally been low because many national
agricultural research services have had little to offer to extension agents.
For example, the decision of African states to hire 50,000 additional
extension agents over the 1959 to 1980 period was a mistake in my
judgment because there was little proven food crop technology available
for the extension agents to extend with a few exceptions, such as corn
in eastern and southern Africa. For example, although the French started
research on millet—a crop that does well in low rainfall (300 to 450
mm)—in Senegal in 1931, there is still no breakthrough in millet research
in Africa after five decades of research.
Let us now examine what can be done to step up food and agricultural
production in Africa by concentrating on the five prime movers.
Technology Generation. There is growing support for the proposi
tion that expanded rural income from multiple sources is a strategic
variable in addressing the hunger and poverty in Africa. In short, com
bating hunger is a more complex process than merely increasing food
production. Hunger can be combated by expanding the production and
sale of food crops, export crops, livestock, food and income earned
from rural off farm employment. Agricultural research that generates
new production technology for food crops, export crops, and livestock,
can be important sources of income generation for farmers and a means
for families to produce food or the income to purchase an improved diet.
There is lack of agreement in the scientific community on the extent
of the backlog of improved food crop varieties that are "on the shelf'
waiting for extension agents to diffuse them to farmers. For example,
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Dunstan Spencer, an authority on African agriculture from Sierra Leone
recently reported that probably less than 2 percent of total sorghum,
millet and upland rice area in West Africa is sown with cultivars
(varieties) through modern genetic research (Spencer 1986, p. 224).
On the other hand, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), of
the United Nations, recently asserted that in Africa "except in arid and
semi-arid areas without irrigation, food production can be roughly doubl
ed with existing technology. Thus, the immediate need is to provide
adequate supplies of fertilizer, improved seeds, tools. . . ."(FAO 1986,
p. 61).
I am of the opinion that the FAO and many other agencies have
overstated the amount of underutilized technology that is on the shelf
waiting for farmers to adopt. The stock of on-shelf improved, farmertested food crop technology is limited today in Africa. The few notable
exceptions include corn in eastern and southern Africa, hybrid sorghum
in the Sudan, potatoes in Rwanda, cassava in West Africa, and wheat
for the cool highlands of Ethiopia, Kenya, northern Tanzania and in
Zimbabwe where it can be grown in the cool winter months (MaySeptember) under irrigation. There is a growing realization that many
of the national research services in Africa do not have the scientific
capacity to borrow, screen, test and adapt agricultural technology from
neighboring countries, regional institutes, the International Agricultural
Research Centers (lARCs) and the global research system.
The strategic importance of an efficient national agricultural research
capacity to develop new crop and livestock technology is illustrated by
Zimbabwe's overflowing grain silos. Currently, Zimbabwe has corn
in storage equivalent to two years of normal domestic consumption.
Corn contributes about 50 percent of the calories in the average diet
in Zimbabwe and it is the staple food in diets in most eastern and southern
Africa. Zimbabwe's corn revolution is of special interest to African
countries because the production of corn by small farmers (smallholders)
tripled from independence in 1980 to 1986. The highlights of Zim
babwe's corn revolution are as follows:
• Zimbabwe's corn revolution has its origins in research on hybrid
varieties that was launched in Zimbabwe (formerly Southern
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Rhodesia) in the 1930s. Zimbabwe became the first country after
the U.S. to introduce hybrid corn in 1950 after carrying out local
research from 1932 to 1950. Subsequent research in the 1950s
led to the development of a high yielding hybrid variety (SR-52)
that was released in 1960 to commercial (large scale) farmers. The
28 years of local research (1932 to 1960) to develop the famous
SR-52 hybrid corn variety (the Green Revolution crop of Southern
Africa) makes a mockery of the three to five year agricultural
research projects that are being currently peddled by foreign donors
(Eicher 1984).
• Research from 1960 to 1975 developed shorter season varieties
for small farmers in low rainfall areas. At independence in 1980,
Zimbabwe had a backlog of corn varieties ready for delivery to
small farmers. Today, 100 percent of the commercial farmers and
roughly 85 percent of the small farmers use hybrid corn varieties,
the highest of any African country (Rohrbach 1987).
• Public investments in roads, credit, extension and supporting ser
vices facilitated the expansion of hybrid maize production by
smallholders from 1980 to 1986.
• Corn prices to farmers were raised from 1980 to 1986 but the
inflation-adjusted prices have fallen since 1984. Hence, maize pric
ing policy by itself does not shed much light on Zimbabwe's maize
revolution.
The message that emerges from Zimbabwe's corn revolution is that
no single prime mover such as favorable corn prices was responsible
for tripling of production by smallholders over the past six years. Zim
babwe concentrated on the five prime movers as a policy package over
a period of decades and developed the preconditions for the "takeoff'
in maize production starting at independence in 1980. This is the cen
tral finding that emerges from Zimbabwe's corn revolution—a message
that is important for other African states, the U.S. Congress and foreign
aid donors.
Human Capital and Managerial Skills. I have already commented
on the great uncertainty on how to strengthen human capital in Africa.
A major challenge facing educators and professional agriculturalists in
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African and donor agencies is figuring out how foreign assistance can
most effectively assist in strengthening Africa's indigenous scientific,
technical and managerial capacity in food and agriculture. Starting with
great confidence in the 1960s, the major donors and the U.S. founda
tions have retreated from investment in human capital in the 1970s and
1980s. For example, the World Bank only extended two educational
loans to Africa in 1984.
Rural Capital Formation. Agricultural development in industrial coun
tries has been fueled by the mobilization of family labor for clearing
land, picking stones and building fences, an accretionary type of capital
formation whereby family labor improves land productivity and the pro
ductivity of livestock herds over generations. Security of tenure plays
a strategic role in converting family labor into capital formation because,
with security, farmers can be assured that farm improvements can be
passed on to the next generation. Unfortunately, in Africa there is a
tendency for donors and private voluntary agencies to dole out subsidized
credit instead of pressuring African governments to raise interest rates
in post office savings banks, rural credit banks, etc., in order that farmers
will have some incentive to save and finance their own farm im
provements. There is a need for African planning to develop policies
and institutions for African farm families to finance their own farm in
vestments as the primary source of rural capital formation.
Rural Institutions. The fourth prime mover is strengthening the per
formance of rural institutions ranging from farmer irrigation associa
tions to fertilizer, credit and seed companies. But there is a paucity of
proven strategies on how to strengthen rural institutions such as
national agricultural research, credit and extension services. Gunnar
Myrdal, the Nobel Laureate in Economics from Sweden, recently
observed that unfortunately most "ordinary" economists assume away
institutions in their studies of Third World development (Myrdal 1984).
Favorable Economic Policy Environment. The fifth prime mover—
favorable economic policy environment—is crucially important in
facilitating the implementation of the first four prime movers. Currently
in Africa, the major donors—led by the IMF and the World Bank—are
pressing African states for policy reforms in exchange for additional
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loans and grants. But there are few solid guidelines on the difficult art
of restructuring institutions such as phasing out or abolishing govern
ment grain boards, abolishing fertilizer subsidies and increasing the role
of private traders in delivering farm inputs and in marketing farm pro
ducts. In Zambia, President Kaunda's regime came close to being toppled
in November of 1986 when 15 people were killed in food riots follow
ing the government's decision to double the retail price of cornmeal—
the staple food of the country—on the advice of the IMF and several
influential western donors.
In summary, there is a need for African governments and donors to
focus on the five prime movers of agricultural development as a policy
package to strengthen the productive capacity of African agriculture
over the long pull. Food aid can be used to buy time until investment
in these prime movers pays off. But donors need to come to grips with
long gestation investments by making an explicit, up-front commitment
to financing human capital and institution building projects for 10 to
20 years in Africa, just as they did in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s.

The Challenge of Reducing Poverty
and Increasing Access to Food
A comparative study of the causes of hunger in the United States,
India and Zimbabwe would reveal that hunger is not simply caused by
the insufficiency of national food production, but poverty, unemploy
ment, landlessness, sickness and other factors. We have questioned In
dia's motives in sending food aid to Africa when about one-fourth (200
million) of its population is hungry. Since each of these three countries
has achieved national food self-sufficiency, one has to look beyond lag
ging food production as the cause of hunger and food insecurity. Since
poverty is a major cause of hunger in both rich and poor countries, raising
per capita incomes is a powerful instrument for helping reduce hunger
in the long run. But the long run may take 20 to 30 years or longer
to raise per capita incomes sufficiently to enable people to purchase
an adequate diet. Therefore, the central policy question is: Do govern-
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ments have an obligation to intervene in the short run to reduce hunger
in rich and poor countries, including both food deficit and food surplus
countries?
In the United States it took several decades of political debate before
a consensus was reached on the need for the federal government to
finance food stamps to enable the poor, sick, and the unemployed to
acquire a calorie-adequate diet. Over the past 15 years under both
Republican and Democratic administrations, the United States has in
vested $9 to 20 billion per year in food transfer programs. But food
stamps and other public food transfer programs require careful economic
analysis in the Third World. This is especially the case in Africa where
the annual per capita income of one-fourth the countries is below $4003
and the national economies are strapped to maintain—let alone
increase—public expenditures on health, education and other basic ser
vices. For example, in Senegal the per capita income is lower today
than it was at independence in 1960. In Zambia the average per capita
income is now almost one-third lower than it was when President Kaunda
took over from the British at independence (Economist 1987).
In 1987, one-fourth of the African countries (12) had food surpluses
and three-fourths (33) had food deficits. The challenge in food deficit
countries is to help increase food production especially among subsistence
farmers. Increasing food production under conditions of rapid popula
tion growth requires attention to the prime movers of agricultural
development over the long pull.
In 1987, 12 African countries had achieved national food selfsufficiency and had grain for sale to neighboring countries. But in most
of these countries, malnutrition is still a major problem because the poor
lack the means (e.g., jobs, income, and credit) to produce and/or pur
chase a calorie-adequate diet. There is growing awareness in African
policy circles and among donors that expanded food production and
the achievement of national food self-sufficiency will not automatical
ly end hunger and that poverty must be addressed in a policy package
to increase food intake among the malnourished.
Fortunately the rhetoric of national food self-sufficiency in many
African countries is diminishing and more countries are starting to focus
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on both sides of the food security equation—food availability—and in
creasing access to food by rural and urban households. Today there
is growing awareness of the need for income and employment generating
activities (e.g., cash crop production such as cotton and rural small scale
industries) to help families acquire the means to increase their access
to food.

The Challenge of Reordering Foreign Aid Priorities
Following the Sahelian drought in the mid-seventies, foreign aid to
Africa was increased dramatically. For example, foreign aid to the
Sahelian countries of West Africa increased at a 40 percent compound
annual rate of growth over the 1971-78 period (Berg 1983, p. 45). To
day most African countries are receiving two to three times more foreign
aid on a per capita basis than their counterparts in Asia. Hence, one
cannot make a blanket case for increasing foreign aid to Africa. In fact,
in some African countries such as Tanzania, Sudan, Liberia, Senegal
and Zaire, foreign aid has been a mixed blessing because of misguided
macroeconomic policies, and low political priority to agriculture. In
almost all African countries, aid is being delivered by a myriad of donor
agencies in the form of short-term projects that do little to strengthen
Africa's basic institutions such as schools, universities and national
agricultural research services. Careful research would probably reveal
that Africa has received too much official development assistance—
especially since 1975—in the form of discrete short-term projects. In
general, foreign aid has not lived up to its full potential in Africa because
most donors shift from fad to fad (e.g., integrated rural development
to basic needs to policy reform) and from subregion to subregion (e.g.,
Sahel to southern Africa).
Since the mid-1980s, most donors have shifted from project to policybased lending under the belief that many of the tens of thousands of
development projects across Africa (e.g., Kenya had around 1,000
development projects in all sectors in 1985) are not performing well
because of adverse macroeconomic policies, excessive state control and
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subsidies. But there is a basic inconsistency in IMF and World Bank
appeals to African countries to reduce the level of subsidies in light
of the heavy role that subsidies play in contributing to food surpluses
in rich countries such as the United States, Japan and in Western Europe.
Since there are many recent book length treatments of foreign aid
(Cassen and Associates 1986) the best one can do here in the limited
space is to point up the complexity of aid and the difficulty of generalizing
about the efficiency of aid across 45 countries in Africa. The most im
portant lesson that donors should learn from the postindependence foreign
aid experience is that Africa is an agrarian continent today as it was
at independence in 1960. Donors should put their assistance behind the
five prime movers of agricultural development over the long pull.

Summing Up
Cutting across the 45 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is the extraor
dinary diversity of African people, their cultures, natural resource en
dowments, stage of development and opportunities for development.
The more experience one gains in Africa, the more one avoids the facile
Pan African generalizations such as Africa is a land surplus continent.
From the past 25 years of Africa's struggle to develop nation-states,
to forge national identities and to improve the welfare of African peo
ple, the following generalization flow about food and agriculture.
There is a need to grasp the immensity and diversity of the African
continent and to seek insights into development problems and solutions
on a subregional basis such as southern Africa, East Africa, Sahel, Cen
tral Africa, etc. For example, because of a backlog of proven varieties
of its staple food—corn—the food outlook in southern Africa is
reasonably optimistic over the coming five to ten years. On the other
hand, in semi-arid regions such as the Sahel, the food outlook is
pessimistic because of the lack of a proven technical package for the
two staple foods consumed by rural people—sorghum and millet—and
the lack of proven technology for the two urban crops, rice and wheat.
Rapid population growth will not slow down in the medium term of
six to ten years. Flooding Africa with contraceptives will not bring about
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a quick reduction in fertility rates. Rapid population growth of 3 to 4
percent per year requires food supplies to grow at 3 to 5 percent per
year—an extraordinary difficult task judging from historical experience.
Despite favorable weather in most of Africa in 1985 and 1986,
Africa faces an enormous food production challenge until population
growth rates slow down over the next 10 to 20 years.
There is a need for stepping up investment in scientific training in
Africa, in reducing the number of fellowships for overseas training,
and for strengthening Africa's research and teaching institutions over
a tune span of the next three to four decades.
Expanding food production in and of itself cannot end hunger in Africa.
Since hunger exists in food surplus nations such as India and the United
States, it follows that vigorous income and employment generation pro
grams are critical in helping people increase their access to food. Present
ly there is little debate on food access in Africa because of the legacy
of the drought, the preoccupation of Ministries of Agriculture in in
creasing production and the prevailing view that a food production short
fall rather than poverty is the main cause of hunger. A vigorous educa
tional program should be launched to move policy debate beyond food
self-sufficiency to include both sides of the food security equationfood availability through domestic production, storage and trade and
access to food through home production, employment, purchase in the
market and food transfers such as food aid.
NOTES
1. Africa will be used in the balance of this chapter to mean Sub-Saharan Africa.
2. A technical package contains two or more components (e.g., new seed, fertilizer) that a
farmer/herder can adopt to increase crop or livestock production.
3. The total fertility rate in many industrial countries is 1.8 to 2.2.
4. See Eicher (1985) for an expanded discussion of the five prime movers.
5. The World Bank defines a poor country as one with an average per capita income of less than
$400.
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